Trump Considers Seizing Iran's Kish Island, But Hormuz Strait Alliance Fails to Get Any Country to Join, Wall Street Calls for Oil to Surge to $150

The Trump administration is evaluating the feasibility of using ground forces to seize Iran’s Halek Island, but the Navy has already designated the Strait of Hormuz as a “kill zone,” and the proposed Hormuz coalition has yet to see any country publicly commit to deploying ships.
(Background: Trump “temporarily halts oil seizure” — further blockade of the Strait of Hormuz would be a 20-fold escalation; EU releases oil reserves as response)
(Additional context: Iran has reportedly fired upon more than ten oil tankers blocking the Strait of Hormuz! Trump warns: tolerating rising oil prices for now, working with Germany and Israel to counter Iran)

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• Halek Island Options: Surgical Strike or Quagmire Entrance
• Warning of $150 Oil and Overlooked Supply Flexibility
• Alliance Logic: Can Personal Favors Summon Warships?

The idea of a Hormuz coalition sounds appealing—multiple countries jointly escorting ships to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, blocked by Iran. The problem is, Trump has reached out to China, France, Japan, South Korea, and the UK, but so far, no country has publicly committed to sending ships. Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy has refused to escort shipping companies, citing a straightforward reason: the strait is now a “kill box,” with threats from missiles, drones, mines, and fast boats.

In other words, while building a multinational coalition for escort, the U.S. Navy itself judges that escorting ships now would be suicidal. This contradiction warrants more serious attention than just oil price trends.

Halek Island Options: Surgical Strike or Quagmire Entrance

According to Axios, Trump is considering deploying ground forces to seize Halek Island, with the key condition being whether oil tankers continue to remain stranded in the Persian Gulf. This conditionality is crucial—it means no final decision has been made, and external variables still influence the outcome.

The strategic value of Halek Island is clear: it accounts for about 90% of Iran’s oil exports, and capturing it would effectively cut off Tehran’s main source of foreign revenue. Pentagon assessments suggest the conflict could last up to six weeks.

But what does “up to six weeks” really mean? Is it an optimistic maximum, or just a baseline estimate? Historically, military operations in the Middle East measured in “weeks” often end up taking “years.” The initial plan for the 2003 Iraq War was also a quick victory. The Pentagon has already dispatched the amphibious assault ship USS LHA-1 and over 2,000 Marines to the region—these are preparations, not a declaration of war, but such preparations are already reshaping regional calculations.

The $150 Oil Warning and Overlooked Supply Flexibility

Wall Street’s current scenario forecasts that if conflict persists, oil prices could reach $150 per barrel. This figure has sparked extensive media discussion, but several variables are systematically underestimated.

First, demand-side pressures. Purchasing managers’ indices in major economies are near or below the contraction threshold of 50, indicating slowing demand. The combination of high oil prices and shrinking demand naturally limits upside potential for oil prices.

Second, the actual capacity of alternative routes. Saudi Arabia’s east-west pipelines (Petroline) and the UAE’s Habshan-Fujairah pipeline have a combined capacity of about 5 million barrels per day, but over 20 million barrels of oil pass through the Strait of Hormuz daily. Alternatives exist, but their capacity is far from enough to fill the gap, at least in the short term.

Third, some market pricing already reflects part of the risk. Since Iran’s blockade actions intensified, Brent crude has already risen significantly, with some tail risks priced in. $150 is an extreme scenario, not the baseline.

Alliance Logic: Can Personal Favors Summon Warships?

Trump’s diplomatic language is quite characteristic. He hints that European allies owe the U.S. a favor over Ukraine and should reciprocate on Iran, saying, “We’ve been very kind.” This “debt of favors” logic might work in bilateral negotiations, but in multilateral military actions involving troop deployments, governments face domestic political costs rather than moral debts.

France’s last military involvement in the Middle East was in 2014 against ISIS, under a clear multilateral framework and UN authorization. Japan’s constitution still strictly limits overseas use of its Self-Defense Forces. South Korea has already heavily constrained its military presence over North Korea issues. China is even less likely to coordinate militarily with the U.S. on the Hormuz issue, despite being Iran’s largest oil buyer and sharing interests in maintaining strait navigation.

This is not to say alliances are impossible, but the current timeline Trump mentions—“to be announced later this week”—and the reality of zero countries publicly committing, reveal a significant gap that needs explanation.