Regarding the threat of quantum computing to Bitcoin, opinions in the industry vary widely. On one hand, the media frequently hype the so-called "quantum doomsday," while on the other hand, the technical community's voice remains much more calm—"The timeline for this threat to materialize is much further out than you think."

Let's first look at the technical level. The impact of Grover's algorithm on SHA-256 has been exaggerated. It can do only one thing: reduce the search space from 2²⁵⁶ to 2¹²⁸—sounds impressive, but 2¹²⁸ is still an astronomical number, and current or near-future quantum hardware cannot practically break it. As for Shor's algorithm, although it theoretically poses a threat to certain cryptographic systems, in reality, the preprocessing requirements and optimization difficulties for quantum computers are enormous, and they are still several technological generations away from universal cracking.

A more critical point often overlooked: breaking Bitcoin is not a one-time computation but requires continuous, rapid, and repeated attacks on the network. Even if quantum computing has an advantage in single tasks, such real-time adversarial scenarios are extremely difficult.

Interestingly, cryptography designers have long considered the evolution of computational power. Decades ago, defense mechanisms were already designed with the challenge of "quadratic acceleration" in mind. Whenever quantum computing becomes a hot topic, it is often accompanied by excessive panic and hype, but those who truly understand the technical details will tell you: such risks have already been anticipated in the cryptographic chessboard.

So the question is—are we overreacting? Quantum computing will inevitably change key management methods, and this is beyond doubt. But to say it can "destroy Bitcoin with one click"? The timeline is probably still several decades away. The security of crypto assets is far from being so fragile.