Thunder 200 Million Lawsuit Against Chen Lei: The Collapse of a Five-Year-Old "Shadow Empire"

After five years, the shocking "Thunder Palace Intrigue" that once rocked the internet circle has once again stirred huge waves.

On January 15, 2026, Thunder and its subsidiary Wangxin Technology filed a civil lawsuit against former CEO Chen Lei and his core team, claiming damages of up to 200 million yuan. This case, accepted by the Shenzhen court, unveils a far more sophisticated "off-balance-sheet" system than five years ago, marking a new stage in the internal conflict that began in 2020, shifting from criminal charges to civil compensation.

The "72-Hour Lightning War" Before Chen Lei's Dismissal

The story's climax lies in the bizarre operations during the last 72 hours before Chen Lei was dismissed as CEO.

Sources reveal that from March 31 to April 1, 2020, Chen Lei, leveraging his final approval authority as CEO of Thunder and Wangxin, approved multiple payments to "Xingronghe Company" over two days, totaling more than 20 million yuan. These payments followed an "same-day issuance, same-day approval, same-day receipt" rapid process, completely breaking the usual "monthly bill, mid-month payment" routine of Wangxin.

Even more suspicious, less than 24 hours after the last payment of 15.3 million yuan was received, Thunder's board issued a statement dismissing Chen Lei. In mid-March, Wangxin had already paid a fee to Xingronghe, and on March 31, an additional 5.5 million yuan was paid—this payment was not aligned with normal payment timelines.

Chen Lei publicly claimed that at the time he was working from home due to illness, when suddenly a "white-clad bodyguard" stormed into Wangxin's office demanding a halt to work, without any prior formal communication. However, Thunder's accusations state that these 20 million yuan was just the tip of the iceberg.

"Xingronghe": A 200 Million Yuan "Shadow Empire"

The core of the lawsuit targets the "shadow system" Chen Lei built—Shenzhen Xingronghe Technology Co., Ltd.

Tianyancha shows that Xingronghe was established in 2018, with Chen Lei arranging for someone to purchase equity from an industrial and commercial agent and instructing controllable personnel to hold shares on behalf. The legal representative of this company, Zhao Yuqin, is the mother of Liu Chao, former HR director of Wangxin; one of the shareholders of the controlling shareholder "Hong'en Technology," Tian Weihong, is the mother of former Thunder senior vice president Dong E. Chen Lei and Dong E are confirmed to have a romantic relationship and have a child.

From January 2019 to early 2020, Wangxin paid approximately 170 million yuan for resource node procurement. But Thunder accuses that this money was paid to a "non-entity" company:

• No board approval: established without approval from Thunder and Wangxin boards

• No business qualification: lacked CDN license at signing, obtained only in June 2019, while the contract was signed in January

• No actual operation: from January to March 2019, Xingronghe had zero employees, collected over 1 million yuan without providing bandwidth services

• No control over funds: bank accounts, official seals, and other key controls outside the listed company's system

Even more astonishing, a month before Chen Lei's dismissal, he arranged for Dong E and Liu Chao to meet with 35 core employees, promising unchanged benefits and collectively transferring to Xingronghe. This "poaching" led Wangxin to pay over 9 million yuan in compensation, and the core R&D team was hollowed out. Additionally, Wangxin sold hardware boxes to Xingronghe, which then resold externally, pocketing an estimated 28 million yuan in middleman profits.

Thus, the composition of the 200 million yuan claim is clear: 170 million yuan for traffic procurement + 28 million yuan hardware profit + other expenses.

From "Keen Cloud" Highlight to Collapse: The Fate of a Token Frenzy

To understand why Chen Lei took such risks, we must go back to the 2017 "Keen Cloud" frenzy that caused Thunder's stock to surge 900%.

In 2014, Chen Lei was recruited from Tencent to Thunder as CTO, overseeing the subsidiary Wangxin Technology. He took over the "Crystal Project" abandoned by founder Zou Shenglong—using user idle bandwidth to build a CDN network. In 2015, the "Money-Making Treasure" hardware was launched, allowing users to earn cash by sharing bandwidth. A year later, platforms like Bilibili became clients, and the user base exceeded 4 million.

But the cash subsidy model caused heavy losses for Thunder. In 2017, Bitcoin prices doubled wildly, and Chen Lei found the "perfect" solution: issuing tokens.

In June 2017, Chen Lei was promoted to CEO of Thunder Group. A month later, Money-Making Treasure was renamed "Keen Cloud," and a virtual asset "Keen Coin" (later renamed "Lianke") was issued. Users' contributed bandwidth and storage were no longer exchanged for cash but for tokens. The price of Keen Coin skyrocketed from 1 cent to over ten yuan, the original 399 yuan Keen Cloud was traded for 2,000–3,000 yuan on second-hand platforms, Thunder's daily revenue exceeded 100 million yuan, and its stock price soared from $4 to $27, a 900% increase.

However, this frenzy lasted only four months. In November 2017, Chen Lei cut old businesses like Thunder Big Data, angering "old Thunder people" represented by senior vice president Yu Fei. Yu Fei publicly accused Keen Coin of being a "scam" and "illegal fundraising," even reporting his own company.

In January 2018, regulatory storms hit, virtual currency markets collapsed, and Keen Cloud and Thunder's stock prices plummeted. By 2019, Thunder's losses continued to grow, and CDN business was besieged by Alibaba Cloud and Tencent Cloud. Chen Lei's "blockchain revolution" ultimately became a trigger for internal conflict.

Thunder's Fall: The End of an Era

Looking back over 20 years of Thunder, one feels a mix of regret.

In 1998, NetAnts solved the "resume from interruption" problem; in 2001, FlashGet added multi-threading. In 2003, Zou Shenglong returned to China to found Thunder, coinciding with the open beta of World of Warcraft. Developer Hou Yantang, addicted to the game, stopped updating for over a year, giving Thunder the chance to surpass. With P2SP technology and "smart use" of user resources, by 2008, it held 73% market share and over 100 million daily active users.

But the success of download business could not hide the failure of other businesses:

• In 2007, Thunder Kankan launched but couldn't compete with Youku

• In 2008, acquired Magic Photo, but was crushed by Meitu Xiuxiu

• In 2011, first IPO failed, burdened with $21.8 million in copyright lawsuits

In 2014, Lei Jun invested $310 million with Xiaomi and Kingsoft, holding 39%, while founder Zou Shenglong's stake was diluted to 9.5%, losing control. Lei Jun regarded Thunder as a "cloud service provider" to empower Xiaomi's ecosystem. But under Zou Shenglong, Thunder "lost money on everything," with dozens of products dead.

Chen Lei's "Token Issue" briefly revived Thunder but also planted the roots of the "shadow empire." In April 2020, veteran Thunder personnel led by Li Jinbo returned to clean house. Chen Lei left the scene without returning; criminal cases were dismissed due to insufficient evidence. Now, civil litigation has resumed, but faces the dilemma of "people and assets both lost"—Chen Lei remains overseas, Xingronghe's account only frozen 30 million yuan, and the final ownership remains to be legally determined.

A Cautionary Tale of Internal Control

This 200 million yuan lawsuit is far more than a personal grudge.

It exposes the typical dilemma faced by Chinese internet companies during transformation: when core business declines and new ventures are explored, how to balance innovation and flexibility with financial compliance? Chen Lei's "Xingronghe" model, under the guise of "avoiding regulatory risks," is actually an "off-balance-sheet" system outside the listed company's framework. Such models are not rare in the crypto world, but within listed companies, they become tools for hollowing out the company.

More ironically, in March 2020, just before Chen Lei's dismissal, he arranged for core employees to transfer collectively to Xingronghe, promising "unchanged benefits." Such "faction-building" behavior is a "taboo" in corporate governance. The Thunder board only discovered the abnormal fund flows at the last moment, indicating that internal control mechanisms had long failed.

Today, Thunder's stock price has fallen nearly 90% from its peak, and its download business is a thing of the past. The myth of rising by "occupying user resources" has collapsed due to "misappropriating company resources." Regardless of the outcome of this lawsuit, it serves as a warning to all tech companies: when power loses oversight and innovation departs from the bottom line, even the highest peaks are just preludes to a fall.

Do you think Chen Lei's "Xingronghe" is a necessary "gray area" for innovation, or a carefully designed利益转移? Is Thunder's decline a human problem or an era problem? Feel free to share your thoughts in the comments.

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