There is a saying that low marriage and fertility rates are due to longer education times, but I checked, and Singapore, with shorter education times, has a lower fertility rate.\n\nLow marriage and fertility rates are fundamentally issues related to the social development process.\n\nThe baby booms of the 60s and 80s were mainly influenced by the agricultural society's preference for larger families in the 60s.\nIn some coastal areas, fishermen often fought, so these areas preferred boys.\nAt that time, during the early years of the founding of the country, all industries were just starting, the state encouraged childbirth, women were more dependent on families, and the opportunity cost of having children was low.\n\nChildren fought, got bloody, and parents mostly didn’t care; there were too many children, and they were raised in a rough manner.\n\nThis period belonged to the era of collective economy, with production teams in rural areas and work units in cities. Medical care and pensions were basic but guaranteed by the collective, resulting in small wealth gaps among people. Children didn’t compare clothing much; having more children was simply about adding more bowls and chopsticks, and in the future, they could serve as a form of old-age security, thus a way to hedge against family risks.\n\nThe baby boom of the 1980s, in my view, was a form of compensatory fertility before family planning policies, driven by the idea that there was no time to wait.\n\nThe biggest current problem stems from the comprehensive costs of childbirth, which are exponentially increasing in terms of economic costs, time costs, and opportunity costs.\n\nIn the past, it was about supporting life; now, it’s about supporting well-being.\n\nPreviously, childbirth could be done at home, mostly natural delivery. Some rural women might have gone back to work just days after giving birth. Now, it involves prenatal checkups, confinement centers, early education, school district housing, extracurricular tutoring, studying abroad reserves—these are dozens of times more than before.\n\nFor example, in the past, children would wear hand-me-down clothes from older siblings. Now, such phenomena are rare. Humans are social animals; often, people change based on observing group behavior. Since most people don’t care much about clothing, many follow trends passively, and everyone values fashion.\n\nWomen also need to work. As education levels and professional status rise, childbirth can interrupt career development, cause loss of promotion opportunities, or even face discrimination. If you’ve interviewed older women who are unmarried or pregnant, or if you are a woman yourself, you might understand this logic better.\n\nYoung people face more competition than before. In the past, there was less overtime. You can ask your grandparents’ generation—they used to finish work early. Now, more effort is needed at work, and there’s less time to spend with children, which is also a factor in choosing not to have children.\n\nWhen the country was just founded, pension policies weren’t as sound, and people relied on traditional old-age support through children. Having one child wasn’t necessarily enough, so having more children was a way to hedge risks. Now, with pensions and social security, people don’t care as much about having many children.\nMoreover, ideological awareness has awakened. People realize that their ancestors have always been at the bottom of society, and if there’s no mineral wealth to inherit, they don’t want their children to suffer.\n\nIn summary: in the past, people could support and raise children, and had no choice but to have more. Now, they can’t support or raise children, and they have a choice, so fewer children are born.\n\nAs for whether it’s related to longer education times, there is definitely a connection. But if everything is attributed to China’s long education period causing low marriage and fertility rates, that’s a bit far-fetched.\n\nLike us, Singapore is a Chinese-governed country that can graduate with a bachelor’s degree at 18-19 and a master’s in a year and a half, so by 20, they have a master’s degree.\nHowever, Singapore’s fertility rate is very low; the data from Doubao shows 0.95, while mainland China is around 1.01, and 2.1 is the replacement level.\n\nYou’ll find that countries with fertility rates above 2.1 are mostly poor or agricultural countries; relatively developed countries generally don’t reach this level.\nLow marriage and fertility rates are not everyone’s fault. If they cannot be improved, it might be the government’s responsibility. For example, the US has also been declining year by year but currently stands at about 1.6.\nAdditionally, with AI now more accessible, everyone should think more deeply.