Author: danny; Source: X, @agintender
With the issuance of new generation cryptocurrencies such as Monad, MMT, and MegaETH, many retail investors participating in the initial offerings face a common challenge: how to secure substantial paper profits?
The general hedging strategy is to open an equivalent short position in the futures market after acquiring the spot, thereby locking in profits. However, this strategy often becomes a “trap” for retail investors with new cryptocurrencies. Due to poor liquidity of new coin contracts and a large amount of chips waiting to be unlocked in the market, “malicious actors” can use high leverage, high financing rates, and precise pump-and-dump tactics to force retail investors' short positions to be liquidated, causing their profits to drop to zero. For retail investors lacking bargaining power and OTC channels, this is almost an unsolvable game.
In the face of the dealer's sniping, retail investors must give up the traditional 100% accurate hedging and instead adopt a diversified, low-leverage defensive strategy: (from a mindset of managing returns to a mindset of managing risks)
Cross-Exchange Hedging: Open a short position in a liquid exchange (as the main locked position), while simultaneously opening a long position in a less liquid exchange (as a liquidation buffer). This “cross-market hedging” greatly increases the cost and difficulty for speculators to target, while also allowing for arbitrage by taking advantage of the funding rate differences between different exchanges.
In the highly volatile environment of new coins, any strategy involving leverage carries risks. The ultimate victory for retail investors lies in adopting multiple defensive measures to transform the risk of liquidation from a “certain event” to a “cost event,” until safely exiting the market.
In actual IPO scenarios, retail investors face two main types of “timing” dilemmas:
Let me dig up something for everyone: Back in October 2023, Binance had a similar spot pre-market product available for hedging in the spot market, but it might have been paused due to the need for launchpool or poor data (the first asset at that time was Scroll). This product could have effectively addressed the issue of pre-market hedging, what a pity~
So this market version will appear, the futures hedging strategy - that is, traders expect to receive spot goods and open short positions in the contract market at a price higher than expected to lock in profits.
Remember: the purpose of hedging is to lock in profits, but the key is to manage risks; when necessary, one should sacrifice part of the profits to ensure the safety of the position.
For example, if your ICO price is 0.1 and the current market price is 1, which is a 10x increase, then the cost-effectiveness of “risking” to open a short position is relatively high. First, it locks in a 9x return, and second, the cost for the manipulators to drive the price up further is also relatively high.
However, in practice, many people blindly open short positions for hedging without looking at the opening price (assuming the expected return is 20%, but in fact, there is no real need for this).
The difficulty of pumping from an FDV of 1 billion to 1.5 billion is much greater than that from an FDV of 500 million to 1 billion, although both represent an increase of 500 million in absolute terms.
Then the question arises, because the current market liquidity is poor, even opening a short position may still be targeted. So what should we do?
Apart from the more complex calculations of the asset's beta and alpha and the correlation with other mainstream coins for hedging, I propose a relatively easy-to-understand strategy of “hedging after hedging” (circular hedging?!).
In short, it means adding a long position to a hedge position, that is, when opening a short hedge position, also opportunistically opening a long position to prevent the main short position from facing forced liquidation. It sacrifices a certain amount of profit in exchange for a safety margin.
Note: It cannot 100% solve the liquidation problem, but it can reduce the risk of being targeted by specific exchange manipulators, and it can also utilize funding rates for arbitrage (provided that 1. stop-loss and take-profit points are set correctly; 2. the opening price has a good cost-performance ratio; 3. hedging is a strategy, not a belief, and there is no need to follow it until the end of time).
Where exactly should I open a short position? Where should I open a long position?
Core Idea: Using Liquidity Differences for Position Hedging
On exchanges with good liquidity and a more stable pre-market mechanism - open short positions, utilizing its large depth, the market makers need to invest more capital to drive up short orders. This greatly increases the cost of sniping, serving as the main profit lock-in point;
Open a long position on an exchange with poor liquidity and high volatility to hedge against the short position of A. If A is violently pumped, the long position of B will follow the rise, compensating for A's losses. Exchanges with poor liquidity are more likely to experience significant pumps. If the prices of A and B are synchronized, the long position on the B exchange will quickly profit, which can offset any potential losses from the short position on the A exchange.
Assuming 10,000 ABC spot. Assuming ABC is worth $1.
Since the short position of $10,000 on Exchange A has a larger exposure than the long position of $3,300 on Exchange B, when the market declines, A's profit exceeds B's loss, resulting in a net profit. The decline in the spot market is hedged by the profits from the short position. (The premise of this strategy is that the hedged returns must be sufficiently high.)
The brilliance of this strategy lies in: placing the most dangerous position (long position) in a less liquid exchange, while placing the most protected position (short position) in a relatively safe exchange.
If the dealer wants to blow up the short position on exchange A, he must:
The difficulty and cost of sniping have increased geometrically, making the operations of the dealer unprofitable.
Utilized market structure (liquidity differences) to establish defenses, and leveraged funding rate differences to generate additional returns (if any)
Finally, if there are any seriously nonsensical takeaways: