Fusion contract hacked, $267,000 transferred to Tornado Cash, DeFi security sounds the alarm again

According to the latest news, CertiK Alert detected a serious security vulnerability in the Fusion PlasmaVault contract on January 7. During a withdrawal operation, hackers used the configured “fuse” contract to transfer all funds (approximately $267,000) to EOA address 0x9b1b, then bridged across chains to Ethereum and deposited into Tornado Cash mixer. This incident once again exposes the security risks in DeFi protocols during the contract configuration phase.

Event Details: The Complete Chain from Configuration to Obfuscation

Attack Process Analysis

The core of this attack lies in exploiting the time gap:

• Hackers initiated a withdrawal call within seconds after the “fuse” contract was configured
• Exploited logical vulnerabilities during the contract configuration phase to bypass normal fund management mechanisms
• Transferred all funds at once to a single EOA address 0x9b1b
• Bridged across chains to Ethereum and finally entered Tornado Cash

The key to this process is the vulnerability in the configuration window. Typically, DeFi contracts have insufficient permission checks during initialization or configuration phases, and hackers leverage this time window to complete fund transfers.

Why choose Tornado Cash

Funds entering Tornado Cash mixers is no coincidence; it reflects the hacker’s clear intent:

• Obfuscate the source and destination of funds: Tornado Cash breaks on-chain fund tracking through mixing mechanisms
• Avoid freezing of funds: Once in the mixer, funds are difficult to trace and freeze
• Prepare for long-term hiding: This is not quick cash-out but long-term concealment

This choice indicates that hackers have a fairly deep understanding of the DeFi ecosystem and privacy tools.

Larger Security Trend Signals

This is not an isolated incident. According to the latest monitoring data, DeFi security incidents are occurring frequently:

Both events reflect the same issue: Weak permission control during DeFi contract initialization and configuration phases.

Why do such vulnerabilities persist

• Rushing to launch leads to insufficient configuration checks
• Development teams overlook boundary conditions
• Even after audits, not all scenarios can be covered
• Hackers are becoming more precise in exploiting time windows

Insights for Users and Projects

Reminders for project teams

• Use multi-signature or time-lock mechanisms during configuration
• Implement a cooling-off period after initialization instead of immediate usability
• Layered permission management; avoid a single contract controlling all funds

Recommendations for users

• Exercise caution when participating in new projects early on; wait and observe
• Follow real-time monitoring and alerts from security agencies like CertiK
• Avoid depositing large amounts into a single contract at once
• Regularly review wallet permissions and revoke unnecessary authorizations promptly

Summary

The severity of the Fusion incident is not only in the $267,000 loss but also in revealing a systemic vulnerability. The hacker’s full chain—from exploiting the configuration window, through cross-chain transfer, to entering the mixer—indicates that attacks targeting DeFi have become a mature routine.

It also serves as a reminder to the entire ecosystem: Audits and monitoring are important but not foolproof. True security requires project teams to consider security thoroughly during design, and users to stay vigilant. While DeFi offers attractive yields, risk management must always come first.