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Larry Gani beheaded, details disclosed
On the early morning of March 17th, local time, Israeli fighter jets once again tore through the Iranian night sky. This time, the victim of the attack was Larijani, the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, the most powerful figure in Iran after the late Supreme Leader Khamenei.
From Khamenei’s assassination on February 28th to Larijani’s assassination on March 17th, less than three weeks have passed. Iran lost its top leader and a key figure capable of managing various factions. This surgical strike targeting the country’s nerve center has once again dealt a heavy blow to Iran’s command hub.
“Indispensable Person”
In Iran’s political system, Larijani is not the most powerful person, but perhaps the most difficult to replace.
Born in 1957 in the Shia holy city of Najaf, Larijani comes from a prominent family: his father was a Grand Ayatollah, his brother Sadeq is the head of the National Interests Council, and his wife’s family is also a foundational figure in the ideology of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Such a family background is almost unmatched in Iranian politics. More importantly, his career spans all dimensions of Iran’s political landscape: he spent ten years hosting the national radio and television, served twice as the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council—considered a key security decision-maker—and was the speaker of the parliament for 12 years. In 2005, Larijani also served as Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, reporting directly to Khamenei.
This multi-faceted experience makes Larijani one of the few individuals within Khamenei’s system capable of bridging religious circles, the military, and civil officials. External assessments often describe him as the most capable coordinator among different factions. During peacetime, this might be just praise; in wartime, it’s an indispensable role.
Khamenei clearly understood this. Reports indicate that, foreseeing potential danger to himself, Khamenei appointed Larijani to oversee the overall situation. Larijani was also one of the last people to meet with Khamenei before his death. The logic behind this arrangement is clear: during Iran’s most vulnerable moments, what is needed is not the most religiously qualified person, but the one with the strongest coordination skills.
However, this also made Larijani a top priority target for Israel.
“Unofficial Glue”
There are several details worth examining about this attack.
First is the location. Iranian officials confirmed that Larijani was killed in an airstrike by US and Israeli fighter jets at his daughter’s home in the Pardis area on the outskirts of Tehran. His son Morteza and several guards were also killed. Hiding in his daughter’s private residence rather than any known official facility or command center indicates Larijani was aware of being on Israel’s assassination list and deliberately blurred the lines between public and private to evade tracking.
Israeli officials revealed that intelligence from Tehran residents over the past 24 hours contributed to this operation. This suggests that Israeli intelligence penetration has reached the very capillaries of Iranian society, far beyond simple technical reconnaissance.
Second is Larijani’s own exposure. Israeli officials pointed out that Larijani had recently been highly visible, frequently appearing in public—attending the Quds Day rallies, engaging with domestic and international media. This high profile ultimately led to his whereabouts being tracked. It’s a paradoxical dilemma: as the official spokesperson of the Islamic Republic after Khamenei’s death, he needed to maintain public appearances to stabilize morale and assert presence; but every appearance also provided clues to opponents. Visibility equals vulnerability—an intractable problem for leaders in the era of targeted assassinations.
Finally, the timing. Iranian state media initially hinted that Larijani was about to make a public statement to refute rumors of his death. The final “refutation” turned out to be a photo of a handwritten condolence note, with Larijani never appearing in person. The attack was precisely timed before this window, indicating a clear psychological warfare tactic.
After Larijani’s death, Iran faces not just the loss of a person but a systemic failure of its temporary power structure.
According to Iran’s constitution, after Khamenei’s assassination, a temporary leadership committee was formed, consisting of President Raisi, Judiciary Chief Ejei, and a legal representative of the Assembly of Experts, Alaraji. An expert council is responsible for quickly selecting a new Supreme Leader during this period. This complete institutional arrangement relies on someone behind the scenes coordinating to keep the machinery running smoothly.
Larijani played this role. Though not an official member of the temporary leadership committee, he was the “unofficial glue” that enabled the committee to function effectively. His job was to prevent hardliners and pragmatists from turning disputes into open conflict during wartime, and to prevent conflicts between the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and civil officials from fracturing unified war decision-making.
With Larijani’s death, this mechanism faces two possibilities: either descending into factional infighting and inefficiency, or being seized by the IRGC to pursue a more hardline approach. Both outcomes are costly for the ongoing war effort. If hardliners take full control, more extreme military actions could become politically acceptable; if power fragments further, Iran’s capacity to fight and negotiate will be severely challenged.
Retaliation and Deadlock
In response to these “targeted killings,” Iran’s retaliation is certain, but signs indicate its retaliatory capacity is diminishing.
Militarily, intensive early clashes have exhausted large quantities of precision-guided munitions; the continuous loss of command systems hampers large-scale coordinated operations; and reports suggest that the commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force was also killed in the strike. This means that even if Iran wants to launch a “shock” missile attack, its execution quality has significantly declined.
Strategically, Iran faces a classic “ratchet dilemma”: retaliate too lightly, and deterrence cannot be restored; retaliate too strongly, and the US might be pulled into the front lines. The Trump administration’s stance remains a variable, with a “Israel-first” policy likely to lead the US to provide more direct military support to Israel during Iran’s escalation.
Deeper constraints come from within Iran itself. Continued war, economic sanctions, and high-level assassinations tend to polarize internal opinions on whether to continue fighting. The most critical option is blocking the Strait of Hormuz, which remains Iran’s “nuclear-level” asymmetric leverage after its conventional military capabilities are weakened. Effectively sealing the strait for a week could cause oil prices to surge above $150 per barrel, putting enormous pressure on the US, Europe, and Saudi Arabia, and facing unprecedented international resistance to Israel’s support.
The Dangerous “Targeted Killings”
From a broader perspective, this conflict exemplifies an extreme form of modern “decapitation warfare.”
Traditional military theory suggests eliminating enemy leadership can accelerate victory, but history offers lessons of complexity. Saddam’s overthrow led to over a decade of chaos in Iraq; Gaddafi’s death left Libya fractured. While decapitation operations can paralyze a regime, they often create power vacuums and disorder.
Iran’s situation is unique. With 47 years of institutional development, its Revolutionary Guard, Basij militia, and religious networks have developed significant autonomous operational capacity. Even if the top leadership and core decision-makers vanish, the system is unlikely to collapse overnight. A more realistic concern is that current leadership vacuum might break the control chain of its nuclear program, leading some hardline actions that are normally restrained by political oversight to lose control, turning nuclear deterrence from a “safety deposit box” into a “last card.”
On the morning of March 17, Larijani posted a photo on social media of a handwritten condolence note addressed to Iranian sailors killed in a US military strike on March 4. This photo has become a symbol of historical significance: a person who initially aimed to “prove he’s still alive” leaving his final public trace—a letter to the deceased.
Larijani’s death marks a significant setback in Iran’s “post-Khamenei era” power transition. Where Iran’s regime goes next, and how the war will evolve, remain uncertain. But when a country’s key coordinator is targeted with precision outside forces, decision-making becomes even more unpredictable. For any party involved, this is a dangerous development.
This article is from China News Weekly.
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