International Observation | Four "Unexpected" Developments, the Trump Administration Is Very Anxious

Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, April 7—
Title: Four “things they didn’t expect,” and the Trump administration is anxious

Xinhua News Agency reporters Lin Yan, Hu Guan, Liu Pinran

On April 6, U.S. President Donald Trump threatened that he would launch large-scale airstrikes against Iran’s infrastructure. The day before, he also posted a profanity-laced message demanding that Iran open the Strait of Hormuz. Observers said that the Trump administration is “anxious, furious, and exhausted” because the war has not gone smoothly, and that it may “go all in” and further escalate the situation.

The U.S. and Israel’s military strikes against Iran have been ongoing for nearly 40 days, and America’s military advantage has failed to translate into strategic victory. Instead, Iran has gained a certain level of strategic initiative through the resilience of its resistance. With multiple decision-making misjudgments piling on top of one another, the Trump administration is being dragged into a strategic predicament from which it is difficult to extricate itself.

One misjudgment: Underestimating Iran’s regime resilience and domestic unity

At first, the Trump administration judged that Iranian public dissatisfaction accumulated from domestic factors such as rising prices had shaken the foundations of the Iranian regime, and that high-intensity U.S.-Israel military strikes would become a “catalyst” for the collapse of the Iranian regime. On the day it launched military action against Iran, Trump publicly incited Iranians to overthrow the regime, saying it was “an opportunity that comes once in a few generations.”

After nearly 40 days of fighting, the Iranian regime has demonstrated resilience in survival. The former Director of National Intelligence of the United States, Tulsi Gabbard, previously admitted that although Iran’s regime had been weakened, it “still remains intact.”

Analysts believe that the Iranian regime’s resilience stems from multiple factors, including domestic politics and national historical and cultural elements.

The Iranian regime has long had extremely strong organizational capacity and mobilization ability. External military pressure, in fact, further strengthens internal cohesion. The killing of the supreme leader, the death of innocent children, and the destruction of cultural heritage… The continued U.S.-Israeli military actions have been continuously fueling intense nationalist sentiment inside Iran.

In his book “The Crescent and the Rose,” Iranian historian Homa Katuzan summarizes the Persian nation’s spiritual undertone as pride, unyielding resolve, revenge, and a willingness not to fear sacrifice. Public opinion believes that these deep-seated cultural genes of Iran are exactly what the Trump administration finds difficult to understand. Before the fighting broke out, Trump had already publicly expressed confusion: with U.S. forces heavily deployed on Iran’s doorstep, “why aren’t the Iranians surrendering quickly?”

David Schilby, a scholar at Cornell University in the United States, said that Trump is encountering “resistance beyond expectations,” making it hard for him to step away.

Second misjudgment: Overestimating U.S. military capability and creating a false sense of certainty

The so-called “quick victory” when the U.S. attacked Venezuela at the beginning of the year led the Trump administration to form the illusion that the U.S. military is “capable of everything” and that it could also achieve “quick victory” in Iran. But the realities of the battlefield keep shattering this illusion.

On March 4, U.S. Defense Secretary Hegseth said that the U.S. and Israel could “completely control” Iran’s airspace within a few days. But one month later, Iranian air-defense fire successively damaged or shot down U.S. aircraft such as the F-35, F-15, and A-10, and in the rescue of the pilots there was only barely no repeat of “Black Hawk Down,” indicating that Iran’s air-defense system had not collapsed.

The Trump administration has also repeatedly claimed that Iran’s missile stockpiles are “almost depleted.” But people in the U.S. intelligence community have recently disclosed that the U.S. can only confirm the destruction of about one-third of Iran’s missile stockpiles; about half of Iran’s missile launch platforms are still intact, and it also has several thousand attack drones in its inventory. At the end of March, a U.S. E-3 early-warning aircraft was shot down at an air base in Saudi Arabia, further confirming that Iran still possesses missile forces capable of conducting precise strikes on high-value U.S. targets.

U.S. air-defense forces are also trapped in a “magazine depth” crisis in “asymmetric warfare.” Iran continuously depletes the “Patriot” and “THAAD” air-defense systems of the U.S. and regional allies through low-cost missiles and drones, forcing the U.S. military to urgently transfer and bring in replenishments from other regions. Data show that in the first month of the conflict, the U.S. has consumed about 2,400 Patriot intercept missiles, while its annual production capacity is only 650.

Elliot Cohen, a retired professor at Johns Hopkins University in the U.S., pointed out that this war exposed a series of shortcomings in the form of insufficient advanced munitions for the U.S. and fundamental flaws in its ways of fighting.

Third misjudgment: Underestimating Iran’s will and capability to blockade the strait

According to disclosures by U.S. media, before taking action against Iran, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Kane, had repeatedly reminded that Iran would likely respond to U.S. strikes by blocking the Strait of Hormuz. Trump dismissed it, believing Iran would quickly give in and that even if the strait were blocked, the U.S. military would be able to cope.

After the U.S. and Israel took military action, Iran immediately took control of the strait, shipping nearly came to a halt. Global energy prices surged, disrupting global trade and supply chains, and also rebounding against the U.S. economy. In mid-March, Trump administration officials admitted they had not done sufficient preparations in advance for the strait’s blockade. Democratic Senator Chris Murphy said bluntly that the Trump administration had neither a response plan for this nor clarity on how to restore smooth shipping routes.

The U.S. is indeed at a loss. Naval escort operations carry high risks and high costs; allies have no intention to participate; and amphibious operations such as taking islands could cause more U.S. casualties. By contrast, Iran only needs to harass a few merchant ships to achieve its goals. Iran’s parliament has also recently passed a plan for strait management, further clarifying its armed forces’ control authority.

U.S. intelligence assessments in recent days believe that Iran regards the Strait of Hormuz as a key “bargaining chip” to counter the United States, and that in the short term it is unlikely to loosen its control over this energy shipping chokepoint. Trump recently said helplessly that even if the strait is in a closed state, the U.S. is willing to end its military action against Iran.

For a long time, the U.S. and Israel have regarded the so-called “possession of nuclear weapons” by Iran as their top threat. Time magazine in the U.S. said that after this war, Iran became even more clearly aware that controlling the Strait of Hormuz is its “true nuclear option.”

Fourth misjudgment: Overestimating domestic U.S. support for the war

Since the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979 and the hostage crisis, hostility toward Iran has become a mainstream consensus in U.S. society, and has further been internalized as a political identity among Republican conservatives.

Analysts believe that based on historical experience and the “rally-around-the-flag effect” that the war might bring, Trump judged that a “quick and decisive” war against Iran could both shape his “strongman” image and temporarily shift voters’ attention away from domestic economic difficulties toward a narrative of a “powerful America.”

But the “rally-around-the-flag effect” did not materialize. The U.S. public showed a clear opposition stance in the early stages of the fighting. As the fighting continued, prices of daily necessities such as gasoline rose sharply in the U.S., and anti-war voices increased further. By the end of March, Trump’s approval rating had fallen to 35%, the lowest point since he returned to the White House.

Trump’s core voter base in the “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) camp also began to fracture. Several conservative opinion leaders publicly opposed the war, accusing Trump of betraying his promises. Recent polling shows that Republican voters’ support for the war has also continued to decline.

U.S. public opinion believes that the likelihood that Trump’s Republican Party will lose control of both chambers of Congress in the midterm elections in November is increasing significantly. When Trump delivered a nationwide televised address on April 1 to defend the war, it precisely exposed his anxiety and unease in the face of boiling public anger and market turmoil.

International media and think tanks have characterized this war as a serious strategic failure. “Once again, the U.S.-Israel war against Iran has proven that so-called superpowers are far from as strong as they appear on the surface,” wrote Bill Emmott, the former editor-in-chief of The Economist in Britain. “What is most astonishing about the Trump administration’s incompetence is not a lack of plans and goals, but its failure to learn lessons from the wars launched by nearly all superpowers after 1945.” (End)