Sold 122 million units! Post-80s Shaoxing boss creates a "Chinese version of LEGO," earning 600 million yuan annually

Source: Brand Observer

When a 9.9 yuan equivalent becomes mainstream, the “Chinese version of LEGO” supported by Ultraman with a valuation of hundreds of billions may find it hard to sustain its profit myth.

In January 2025, Bluoké listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, delivering a dazzling performance—over 6,000 times oversubscription, with frozen funds once exceeding “Top Beauty Stock” Mao Geping, becoming the second-largest “frozen fund king” in Hong Kong stock history.

Image source: Internet

With support from star funds like Yunfeng Fund, Junlian Capital, and Source Code Capital, Shaoxing native Zhu Weisong, born in the 80s, spent ten years turning a building block toy company into a new darling of the capital market.

At that time, Bluoké was highly anticipated, and the title “Chinese LEGO” was quite well-known in the toy industry. The Ultraman IP was a strong boost, and the wind of the “Goose Economy” was also powerful. After going public, the stock price once soared to HKD 198, and everything seemed so smooth.

Image source: Snowball

However, just one year later, the stock price plummeted. On March 13, 2026, Bluoké released its first-year financial report post-IPO, with revenue of 398M yuan, up 30% year-on-year, and annual profit reaching 633 million yuan, turning losses into profits.

Image source: Bluoké 2025 Financial Report

Compared to this impressive report card, Bluoké’s stock price looked less attractive, with a downward trend across the market in March.

On March 13, Bluoké closed at HKD 61.25, approaching the IPO price of HKD 60.35, down nearly 70% from its peak of HKD 198.

Image source: Snowball

The market’s “foot voting” isn’t without reason; behind it lies concerns about the data in the financial report. The first issue is sales costs—while revenue grew at 30%, sales costs surged to 45.9%, far exceeding revenue growth.

Image source: Bluoké 2025 Financial Report

Looking at the adjusted net profit margin, contrasting with the growth in revenue and gross profit, this indicator actually declined from 26.1% in 2024 to 23.2% in 2025.

Image source: Bluoké 2025 Financial Report

Meanwhile, the revenue structure is highly unreasonable, with over 70% still relying on licensed IP, and proprietary IP almost negligible.

What’s more worrying is that the low-priced product launched at 9.9 yuan at the end of 2024 sold 122 million units in 2025, accounting for 47.8% of total sales.

In this situation, the more you sell, the less you earn—whether this is a strategic choice to expand the market or a helpless move driven by low-price competition remains unknown.

Image source: Bluoké 2025 Financial Report

All we see is that once highly sought-after “Oversubscription King” Bluoké’s stock price fell to near the IPO price within a year. This once-glorious “Chinese LEGO” is no longer as vibrant as before.

Selling 122 million units at 9.9 yuan

And then?

To understand why Bluoké’s growth suddenly stalled, we need to look back to the series of products launched at the end of 2024.

At the end of 2024, Bluoké launched a low-priced product at only 9.9 yuan, mainly to expand sales channels and penetrate lower-tier markets. The effect was as expected.

Image source: Internet

In 2025, sales of products in this price range reached 541 million yuan, with 122 million units sold, accounting for 18.6% of total revenue.

Image source: Bluoké 2025 Financial Report

In the overall toy market, this performance is quite good, but the cost is significant.

Based on 541 million yuan revenue and 122 million units sold, the actual average unit price of products in the 9.9 yuan range was only 4.43 yuan, meaning most products were sold at discounts below 9.9 yuan. Channel promotions, platform subsidies, and inventory clearance all lowered the actual transaction price.

The first consequence of selling products at low prices is a reduction in overall gross profit margin. Financial data shows that Bluoké’s overall gross profit margin in 2025 was 46.8%, down 5.8 percentage points from 2024. Considering nearly half of sales came from 9.9 yuan products, this decline was likely driven by low-price products.

Image source: Internet

More troubling is that the low-price strategy is changing consumer expectations. When 9.9 yuan becomes the norm, will consumers still be willing to pay for products priced at 39 or 59 yuan?

If core IPs like Ultraman and Transformers can be bought at “bargain prices,” how can the brand maintain its premium?

Opening Bluoké’s Taobao flagship store, the lowest price of products on sale is 12.9 yuan, with main product prices ranging from 16.9 yuan to hundreds of yuan. This price range is cheaper than LEGO but more expensive than domestic knockoffs. In this light, Bluoké is caught in an awkward middle ground—unable to reach LEGO’s brand premium, yet undercut by low-cost knockoffs.

Image source: Taobao screenshot

Image source: Taobao screenshot

Zhu Weisong, who left Youzu Network to start his own business, initially had no intention of being stuck in the 9.9 yuan low-price quagmire. But the reality is, once the low-price strategy is launched, it’s hard to withdraw. Whether Bluoké can escape this mud pit in 2026 remains an unresolved question.

Turning losses into profits!

Where does the profit come from?

Despite such a drastic low-price strategy, Bluoké still managed to turn losses into profits. Where does this profit come from?

First, look at the financial figures. In 2025, Bluoké’s revenue grew 30% year-on-year, and net profit, which was a loss of 319M yuan in 2024, turned positive. It’s hard to find fault with this.

Image source: Bluoké 2025 Financial Report

But a closer look reveals issues.

In 2024, Bluoké’s administrative expenses reached 465 million yuan, mainly due to a one-time stock-based compensation of 359 million yuan related to stock incentive plans granted in April that year. This one-off expense significantly inflated the 2024 loss base. By 2025, administrative expenses dropped 78.9% to 98 million yuan, returning to normal levels.

Image source: Bluoké 2025 Financial Report

Another key factor is the fair value change of convertible redeemable preferred shares. In 2024, this item caused a book loss of 541 million yuan. After listing in 2025, the preferred shares were converted into common stock, and this item no longer caused further changes or impacts on the income statement.

Image source: Bluoké 2025 Financial Report

These two items together made the profit statement look quite bright. In other words, Bluoké’s 2025 profit turnaround was largely driven by non-operational gains, not real improvement in core business profitability.

The true indicator of core profitability, the adjusted net profit margin, actually declined by 2.9 percentage points year-on-year, and gross profit margin fell by over 5 percentage points.

On one hand, the increased proportion of low-priced products lowered the overall average price; on the other hand, soaring sales costs caused gross profit margin to decline. Bluoké’s profit model is under double pressure.

High dependency on IP

How long can Ultraman support?

Bluoké’s growth fundamentally depends on Ultraman’s IP support.

In 2021, Bluoké obtained Ultraman IP licensing and launched building block character toys, quickly opening the market. That year, Ultraman’s IP almost single-handedly supported Bluoké’s explosive growth. It can be said that Ultraman played a crucial role in Bluoké’s rapid revenue growth in 2023 and 2024.

Image source: Internet

The 2025 financial report shows that revenue from Transformers, Ultraman, Kamen Rider, and Hero Unlimited accounted for 950 million, 810 million, 330 million, and 260 million yuan respectively, totaling 80.4% of total revenue.

Among them, Hero Unlimited is the only self-developed IP, accounting for 9% of total revenue. The other three major series are licensed IPs, with combined revenue share exceeding 70%.

Image source: Bluoké 2025 Financial Report

In other words, over 70% of Bluoké’s revenue is controlled by others.

The business model of licensed IP is inherently fragile: licenses are typically renewed every 3-5 years, renewal uncertainty is high, and renewal costs tend to increase annually. Competitors may also swoop in with high bids to snatch IP rights, especially top-tier IPs like Ultraman and Transformers, which are fiercely contested within the industry.

Image source: Internet

Bluoké clearly recognizes this problem. By the end of 2025, the company increased its licensed IPs from 50 in 2024 to 73, adding new licenses such as Toy Story, Zootopia, and Frozen. This broad distribution strategy does mitigate reliance on a single IP, but it’s only a superficial fix.

Image source: Bluoké 2025 Financial Report

To stabilize its revenue base, Bluoké still needs to develop proprietary IP. By the end of 2025, it had only two self-developed IPs: the children’s “Variety Bluoké” and the Chinese cultural-themed “Hero Unlimited.”

But from current performance, neither can shoulder the revenue burden, still lagging far behind popular licensed IPs.

Image source: Internet

Without proprietary IP, there’s no pricing power, no brand premium, and no brand moat—this is Bluoké’s most critical vulnerability.

The road to going global

Looks promising but difficult

In 2025, besides strong performance in China, Bluoké’s overseas business also delivered impressive results, with overseas sales reaching 318 million yuan, up 396.6% year-on-year.

Among them, the Americas grew by 804.1%, Asia (excluding China) by 238.1%, with the US and Indonesia becoming the top two overseas markets.

Image source: Bluoké 2025 Financial Report

Data shows that overseas expansion is accelerating, but on closer inspection, the 3.19 billion yuan overseas revenue only accounts for 11% of total revenue. In other words, Bluoké still heavily relies on the Chinese market, and overseas business is still in its infancy.

Another concern with overseas expansion is costs. Entering new markets requires significant marketing investment, adapting product designs to local consumers, and establishing new distribution channels.

In 2025, Bluoké’s sales and distribution expenses increased by 36.6% to 386 million yuan, with marketing expenses rising by 37.7 million yuan. Much of this is the cost of overseas expansion.

Image source: Bluoké 2025 Financial Report

More critically, in the global building block toy market, Bluoké’s competitors are giants like LEGO and Bandai. LEGO boasts nearly a century of brand history, a global distribution network, and countless classic proprietary IP.

Bandai owns top IPs like Gundam, Dragon Ball, and One Piece, with decades of fan base accumulation. Bluoké’s only notable self-developed IP is Hero Unlimited—what can it do to compete?

Image source: Internet

According to the financial report, Bluoké plans to focus on deepening its expansion in North America and Europe in 2026. While ambitious, the challenge is enormous. To compete in LEGO’s home turf, it takes not just determination but real strength.

Final thoughts

Bluoké’s story is a typical Chinese entrepreneurial case: born in the 80s, from the gaming industry, crossing into toys, seizing IP opportunities, rapidly scaling, and attracting capital for IPO. But going public is just the beginning of the test.

In just one year, from “Oversubscription King” to a stock price approaching the IPO level, the market has spoken. The core issues are clear: over 70% revenue depends on licensed IP, proprietary IP is minimal, low-price products sold over a billion units, gross profit margin dropped five points, overseas expansion is fast but accounts for less than 10%.

None of these problems are easy to solve. IP renewal costs will only rise, low-price strategies are hard to reverse once launched, and competing against giants like LEGO and Bandai overseas is daunting. Bluoké needs more than storytelling; it must solve these real problems.

When Zhu Weisong left Youzu Network, he surely had bigger ambitions. But making toys is different from making games—games can rely on a hit to make quick money, but toys require slow brand and IP building. LEGO took nearly a century to reach today; Bluoké has only been ten years on the road, and the journey is still long.

Turning losses into profits in 2025 is a good start, but only that. The real test will be in 2026 and 2027—when the marginal effect of Ultraman IP diminishes, Bluoké may no longer rely on proprietary IP and brand premiums to sustain growth. That will be the key to whether it can become the “Chinese LEGO.”

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