The new queueing king "Fresh Snacks," is it truly an industry trend or just an IQ tax?

Does the AI Short-term Supply Chain for Fresh Snacks Become a Hindrance to the Goal of Thousands of Stores for New Snacks?

Text | Xiao Tian

By 2026, after the “Zhao Yiming” chain of thousands of stores in the snack sector has expanded rapidly, a new model has recently emerged.

In first-tier commercial districts and key shopping malls in Beijing, Shanghai, Wuhan, Nanjing, and other cities, a new type of fresh snack business has become the “new queue king.”

But in reality, fresh snacks are not a new species.

In 2023, when discount snack stores were at their peak, fresh snacks also enjoyed a brief moment of popularity under the spotlight. Until now, the previous wave of the bulk snack industry has fallen into “traffic hunger, profit hunger, and return rate hunger,” and this sector has truly begun to “break out”:

Yili, founded in Shenyang, currently has nearly 70 stores nationwide; Jinli Men and Jiduquan, originating from Changsha, each have over 20 and 60 stores respectively; in addition, Pumama, which has a large presence in Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Fujian, and the new brand “You·Recommend” founded by Mingming are also expanding rapidly.

Unlike traditional offline snack shops and bulk snack stores, these stores are not relying on a large SKU count or high cost-performance ratio, but emphasize “freshly made”—on-site production with a short shelf life, consolidating some categories into 3-4 small categories for quick turnover.

In these stores, you’ll find products that can be sampled, with staff available to serve customers. Nuts, dried fruits, and baked goods are packaged in transparent containers, somewhat like a scaled-down version of Sam’s/HeMa’s bakery section.

Some consumer investors say that fresh snacks are the most eye-catching consumption item in the past six months, “each store performs very well.” Although their scale cannot yet compare to bulk snack stores, their expansion speed is impressive. “Jiduquan,” which was established just a year ago, has already announced a goal of reaching 1,000 stores. Other brands are also expanding rapidly, broadening their reach into more cities.

But behind the lively scene, there are unavoidable issues:

How to solve the supply chain challenges behind the definition of “fresh”? How to transition from food safety standards typical of catering retail? And how to balance short shelf life, scale, and price? The answers remain uncertain.

If these issues cannot be resolved, fresh snacks might go from a hot trend to just a gimmick in the blink of an eye.

1. The consumption upgrade of bulk snacks, high-end roasted goods versus low-end snacks

Approach any fresh snack store, and you may find it quite different from your expectations: it resembles a snack shop, a roasted goods store, and even has some restaurant attributes. Instead of calling it a “fresh snack shop,” it might be better called a “fresh food store”—

Compared to the thousands of discount snack stores that open everywhere, its SKU count is limited to about 300, with a focus on freshness and health as the main selling points;

Compared to “Xueji,” a nut and roasted goods shop, it reconfigures categories like snacks, baked goods, marinated foods, desserts, and beverages, forming a more complex “collection store” model.

To some extent, the popularity of the fresh snack sector also stems from these two sectors.

On one hand, over the past two years, bulk snacks expanded rapidly through low prices and a vast variety of products, making “cheap” and “many choices” capabilities common in the offline snack industry.

But as growth potential plateaus, the entire industry is shifting from scale expansion to “refined cultivation.” Even so, gross profit margins continue to decline.

In response, many leading brands are stepping out of the “snack” category and transforming into full-category discount supermarkets, launching “money-saving supermarkets” by expanding product categories horizontally to explore new growth.

The emergence of fresh snacks is driven by the industry’s attempt to break out of the homogenization and price wars within the snack sector.

For example, Zheng Zhenghuan, founder of Pumama, was previously a regional discount snack brand founder. He mentioned that the motivation for founding Pumama was “to seek breakthroughs and jump out of the price war of discount snacks.”

On the other hand, brands like Xueji Roasted Goods, Qiwang Peanuts, and Guo Liyuan have relied on freshly made roasted goods, loose packaging, shopping mall channels, and popular single products to rise quickly, but are also quietly becoming more expensive.

Earlier this year, “high-end roasted goods prices surged,” trending on social media, with Xueji being the most mentioned brand. For example, sunflower seeds that cost ten yuan elsewhere can be bought in bulk for that price, but Xueji’s sunflower seeds are 23.8 yuan per jin, roasted cashews are nearly 100 yuan per jin, freeze-dried strawberries are 138 yuan per jin, and hand-peeled pine nuts cost as much as 218 yuan per jin…

In fact, Xueji roasted goods was once called the “Chow Tai Fook of roasted goods” by netizens, and people with a 100k yuan year-end bonus dare not enter Xueji’s roasted goods shop.

From this perspective, the average customer spend at fresh snack stores is around 45-55 yuan, which is relatively moderate compared to nut and roasted snack shops that can be described as “assassin” level in terms of customer spend. It can be seen as a kind of disguised alternative.

Moreover, from the consumer side, “fresh, healthy, and low-additive” has become the core trend of snack consumption. Young consumers are willing to pay for freshness and quality, which provides a certain market demand for fresh snacks.

This also explains why newly opened fresh snack stores tend to perform well in the short term.

According to multiple media reports, “Jinli Men” has an average monthly sales per store of about 1.5 million yuan, with the best-performing stores reaching 4 million yuan per month; “Pumama” has a maximum monthly sales per store of 2.5 million yuan.

According to “Zhaibo,” the gross profit margin of fresh snack stores is around 30%-35%, with a net profit margin close to 15%. Leveraging the traffic effect brought by the fresh experience, a single store can reach 2 million yuan in monthly sales. With store sizes of 200-300 square meters and investments of 2-3 million yuan, the break-even point is typically reached within 7-9 months.

2. From homogenization to differentiation, and then back to homogenization

If you carefully observe brands like Jinli Men, Yili, and Jiduquan, you’ll find that although their signs differ, their core concepts are remarkably similar: transforming snack shops from simple sales spaces into a collection of freshly made snack stores.

The key change in these stores is that part of the production and processing of snacks is brought back into the store, directly implementing the “freshly made” logic at the front end.

Ovens, steaming machines, and workbenches become important areas within the store. Freshly roasted chestnuts, freshly baked goods, marinated foods, and freshly squeezed juice, together with nuts, dried fruits, and meat jerky, form the main product structure.

As discount snack stores and traditional roasted goods shops are deeply stuck in homogenization—competing on scale, channels, and lowest prices—fresh snack stores are choosing to compete on time—40% short shelf-life products, 4-5 days of shelf life, with supply chains operating on a “day” basis rather than weekly.

To some extent, fresh snacks have moved beyond previous homogenization toward sector differentiation. However, this differentiation is relative.

This is because, behind the fresh snack stores, there exists a “short shelf life, scale, and price” triangle, and achieving all three simultaneously is very difficult.

Some say these three goals are like three ropes, pulling one tight makes the other two taut—that’s not an exaggeration.

A short shelf life means the supply chain must respond extremely quickly, inventory turnover must be precise, and any misjudgment results in real losses. Scaling up requires central factories, cold chain logistics, and standardized operations—each a heavy asset investment. To keep prices affordable, costs must be spread over scale, but scale and the regional nature of short shelf life are inherently conflicting.

The result is that, although brands attempt to differentiate their positioning, their product mixes are almost identical—various nuts, dried fruits, and meat jerky—overlapping in products and prices. Even the products placed at the entrance for sampling, like roasted sweet potatoes, are the same.

This homogenization extends to store design as well. For example, Jinli Men’s store design was revamped by the firm ABCD, which specializes in “Jiao Nei” (banana interior) style, emphasizing a minimalist industrial aesthetic. This style quickly became the standard for nearly all fresh snack brands.

In other words, these fresh snack stores are merely shifting from an intensely competitive old sector to another sector on the verge of saturation, falling into the trap of homogenization before even establishing a foothold.

Even more exaggerated, today’s offline chains that can break even within 18 months are considered high-quality targets by franchisees. The short payback period of fresh snack stores is attracting more practitioners. Currently, “Jiduquan” has opened franchise opportunities.

3. Is fresh snacks really a good business?

For many players considering entering the fresh snack sector, this business looks lively but hides many risks.

The reason is simple: many stores follow a “wide category, narrow product” approach, significantly reducing SKUs. For ordinary consumers, they are used to either “single-item” stores or “everything” stores.

These fresh snack stores do not offer much differentiation; other bakeries may sell similar products at comparable prices. The “middle route” may also lead to consumers not finding exactly what they want.

Today, fresh snack stores are trying to make up for this shortcoming in two ways—

One is to retain customers through sampling, aroma, and the freshly made process. In Jiduquan stores, almost all products can be tasted. Some freshly baked items are replenished constantly, allowing customers to smell the aroma at the entrance. Often, customers are attracted first by the smell and sampling.

But this also means they find it hard to compete with bulk snack stores relying solely on low prices and standard shelves. Fresh snacks sell not just the products but also the idea that they are fresher and worth paying a bit more for.

The other is to increase purchase frequency by adding high-frequency items like marinated foods, desserts, and beverages.

However, these items can attract foot traffic but usually have more transparent pricing and less profit margin; if sales are slow, they quickly turn into losses.

Whether improving service experience or adding high-frequency products, both require operational capability, innovation, and deep supply chain management.

For example, building a supply chain for short shelf life products involves managing a high-frequency iteration and strong control over proprietary products. The logic of deep OEM factory partnerships is similar to Sam’s/Costco’s supply chain: creating differentiation through customization and encouraging repeat purchases through frequent new offerings.

But many domestic snack OEM factories that follow mass-market strategies primarily produce long shelf life products. Transitioning from long shelf to short shelf is not an easy change overnight.

Therefore, for these stores, the challenge is not just producing the products but continuously and stably selling them. Store location, customer flow, replenishment rhythm, and supply chain turnover all directly impact the viability of this business.

More critically, the fresh snack sector is still in its infancy, characterized by “model testing and regional validation.” Last year’s development shows that supply chain issues across regions are not fully resolved, and the damage caused by short shelf life products’ losses has not been fully addressed.

The most fatal problem for fresh snacks is the domino effect of losses.

In the early explosive phase, these stores had good turnover and manageable losses. But once expansion or competition causes traffic diversion, or consumer novelty wears off, performance declines sharply, and losses increase significantly. Losses directly impact net profit and can extend the typical 7-9 month payback period indefinitely.

In fact, some fresh snack brands have already shown issues related to their short shelf life.

In January 2026, Jinli Men was embroiled in controversy after media exposed serious food safety issues with its OEM factory. Although Jinli Men responded quickly and set aside a 12 million yuan compensation fund, once consumer trust is broken, it’s very hard to rebuild.

This highlights that the “short shelf life” characteristic demands perfection at every link: raw material safety, pollution-free production, seamless cold chain, real-time inspection—all are difficult to guarantee fully in practice.

Even if these issues are addressed, there remains a fundamental paradox: fresh snacks are mostly just a performance of freshness.

Looking closely at the bulk products in these stores, they are often semi-finished pre-made items, such as roasted sweet potato strips made from pre-dried sweet potatoes baked in an oven, or ice cream made from finished milk pulp, with ingredients not clearly labeled on the packaging.

An industry insider notes that fresh snacks often use a “frozen-to-fresh” approach—delivering products in a frozen state from factories or central kitchens, then converting them to “fresh” in the store for short-term sale.

When the traffic wave recedes, this existing model and process, branded as “fresh,” will be re-evaluated by consumers. Perhaps accepting that they cannot achieve the scale of thousands of stores like discount snacks is the best outcome.