Core Support: Fenqile is Under Interview; Lexin, Earning 1.7 Billion Annually, Faces a Major Compliance Test

Lexin’s core support, Fenqile, urgently needs to undergo a comprehensive and thorough compliance overhaul. Only by truly transforming into a technology + service-oriented company, with advantages in risk control, cost efficiency, and inclusive finance, and achieving operational differentiation, can consumers genuinely trust Lexin.

Recently, the State Financial Supervision and Administration Bureau issued a notice, conducting centralized regulatory interviews with five platform operators: Fenqile, Qifu Borrow, Niwo Dai Loans, Yixianghua, and Credit Fei, pointing directly at five core issues: misleading marketing, opaque interest and fee disclosures, improper collection practices, and requiring comprehensive rectification.

Fenqile, ranked first in regulatory interviews, has been entangled in complaints since being exposed for campus loans in 2016, involving high-interest lending,乱收费,诱导借款,强制购物, and other irregularities.

Fenqile is a credit consumption marketplace under Lexin (LX.O), listed on the US stock market, providing installment shopping and small loans, mainly targeting young consumers.

Fenqile is the main source of Lexin’s revenue and profit. Despite being plagued by complaints, Lexin’s profitability is remarkable. In 2025, Lexin earned 1.7 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of over 50%.

01

“Typical Violations” — Fenqile Summoned for Regulation

Fenqile, as a “typical violation,” was summoned by the National Financial Supervision and Administration Bureau.

As the primary target of regulatory interviews, Fenqile is the institution with the most typical problems and the highest complaint volume among the five platforms. Fenqile received over 160k complaints, accounting for 57.14% of the total 280k complaints against the five platforms.

In recent years, consumer complaints about Fenqile mainly include high-interest loans, opaque fees,诱导借款,会员费收取,强制购物, and暴力催收.

On the Black Cat Complaint Platform, on March 13, a consumer complained that they borrowed a total of 64k yuan from Fenqile, with each loan having an interest rate above 36%. Another consumer stated they borrowed 8,800 yuan on Fenqile and repaid 14,480 yuan.

On the ZhiMuNiao Complaint Platform, there are also many complaints about Fenqile’s high-interest loans. On March 11, a consumer reported 14 loans on Fenqile, with 12 of them charged extra under the names of “guarantee fees” and “service fees.” Although the annual interest rate shown on the loan page was between 24% and 36%, after adding guarantee and service fees, the actual rate exceeded 36%.

Many complaints point to Fenqile’s hidden charges and套路贷. Fenqile packages “high-interest loans” as “inclusive finance,”拆分贷款, creating the illusion of small loans with超长分期 to reduce repayment pressure, but in reality charging high credit assessment fees, guarantee service fees, and other附加费用, with the overall annualized percentage rate (APR) often exceeding 36%, even surpassing 40%, precisely targeting young people lacking financial literacy.

Ms. Chen, who studied at a private university in Anhui, fell into debt trouble with Fenqile, a case once reported by the media as典型.

According to reports, in 2020, Fenqile sales staff persuaded Ms. Chen to apply for five loans: 6,800 yuan (36 installments), 1,000 yuan (24 installments), 3,500 yuan (36 installments), 400 yuan (36 installments), and 1,974 yuan (12 installments). The annual interest rates ranged from 32.08% to 35.90%. By August 2022, unable to repay, Ms. Chen chose to stop repayment. In February 2026, she contacted Fenqile, hoping to negotiate a solution to the high interest rates.

It is reported that Ms. Chen borrowed a total of 13,674 yuan, with the platform showing a total repayment of 26,859 yuan.

强制购物 and bundled sales are another way Fenqile harvests borrowers. On March 13, a consumer complained that on March 9, they borrowed on Fenqile, and without their knowledge, Fenqile bundled a purchase of a 超市卡 worth 1,950 yuan, and for a 3,000 yuan loan, they were forced to repay 4,950 yuan.

Another consumer reported that shopping or buying cards on Fenqile involved bundling, with JD E-cards, Ctrip cards, and Alipay red envelopes packaged as “lifestyle service sets.” One consumer said they bought Alipay red envelopes on Fenqile, paying 1,430 yuan but only received 1,000 yuan in actual funds, with the rest in various unusable vouchers, and repaid in three installments, totaling over 1,500 yuan. They suspected套路贷.

Another consumer stated that on Fenqile APP, they purchased a 1,000 yuan JD E-card, which was defaulted to be bundled with a 400 yuan coupon, making it impossible to buy the E-card alone; they had to pay 1,400 yuan to place the order, a typical case of强制搭售 and disguised premium charges.

On the People’s Complaints Platform, there are also many complaints about Fenqile’s bundling sales. One consumer reported buying four Alipay cashback products totaling 10,500 yuan, but only received 8,000 yuan in actual cashback, plus some platform membership fees, with a total repayment of 11,005 yuan over three months, an annualized rate of 175%. The consumer believed this was malicious bundling and disguised usury.

02

The Shadow of Campus Loans Remains

Compliance Challenges

Complaints against Fenqile continue, and compliance seems to be a difficult issue.

Fenqile, a credit consumption marketplace under Lexin offering installment shopping and small loans, launched in October 2013, pioneered China’s installment shopping e-commerce model.

From the start, Fenqile targeted college students ignored by traditional financial institutions. Its core logic was simple and effective: through campus推广, providing “0首付购买手机、笔记本” services to students without credit cards but with strong消费欲望.

With capital support, Fenqile expanded rapidly, once covering 99% of Chinese universities.

However, Fenqile’s reputation is tainted with原罪. In 2016, some online lending platforms used虚假宣传,隐瞒实际资费标准, and other means to诱骗在校大学生过度消费,甚至陷入高利贷陷阱,引发社会关注。随之而来的,是全国范围内的打击校园贷行动。

2016年,Fenqile升级为乐信集团,开始“合规包装”与战略转型。在继续服务年轻人群的同时,Fenqile全面转向白领、蓝领等更广泛的互联网消费人群,试图撕掉“校园贷”的标签。乐信打造了以分期乐(消费金融)、提钱乐(普惠人群)、桔子理财(互联网理财)和鼎盛资产(资产管理)为一体的业务矩阵。

2017年12月,乐信成功登陆美国纳斯达克,被誉为“分期电商第一股”。上市后,乐信的业务模式逐步从表面的“电商”转型为助贷平台。

然而,实际上,针对Fenqile从事校园贷的投诉一直未曾停止。

2024年5月,据中国商报报道,Fenqile涉嫌诱导部分高中生和大学生分期消费或违规放贷。济南中院2017年的刑事判决曾记载证人Fenqile员工刘某的证言:“公司经营Fenqile网络平台,主要服务大学生群体。”

2019年5月,新华社以《创业贷、培训贷、求职贷……禁令之下校园贷“披马甲”依然横行!》为题报道,Fenqile声称面向年轻人,实际上在校大学生也能借款。

报道称,有业内人士称,“Fenqile故意诱骗没有稳定收入来源的学生超能力消费和借贷款,在学生无还款能力时进行电话和短信威胁,‘绑架’家长还款。”

上述在Fenqile平台借款的陈女士,借款时就是在校大学生。

在黑猫投诉等平台上,也有不少关于Fenqile向在校大学生发放贷款的投诉。

一名投诉称,Fenqile借款综合成本36%,其在上学期间就曾被Fenqile提供借款。

Fenqile发表声明称,大学生在网上进行消费分期和贷款,并不意味着都是违规校园贷。公司表示,自己从事的是撮合业务,已将校园贷推荐给银行而非网贷机构。

当然,也有人指出,由于借款是线上完成的,若借款人不主动告知,平台也难以快速甄别。

校园贷阴影依旧,合规,似乎成为Fenqile的难题。

03

已走至转型的十字路口

野蛮生长的Fenqile背后,乐信的经营业绩大幅增长。

3月19日,乐信公布了2025年第四季度及全年业绩。第四季度,营收3.04B元,同比减少16.8%;归母净利润214M元,同比下降约41%。经调整后,归母净利润为239M元,同比下降38.9%。

2025年全年,乐信实现营收13.15B元,同比减少7.4%;归母净利润1.68B元,同比增长52.4%。经调整后,归母净利润为1.8B元,同比增长49.2%,明显实现盈利增长。

从利润表看,归母净利润大幅增长,主要源于信用减值损失减少。2024年,或然负债拨备减少至3.66B元,2025年降至3.18B元,减少481M元。此外,担保负债减值损失转回508M元,两项合计为989M元。

信用减值损失的减少,表明乐信资产质量改善,成本费用得到优化。

乐信的主营业务表现为:信贷便利服务收入9.56B元,同比下降13.1%;科技赋能服务收入2.08B元,同比增长10.6%;分期电商平台服务收入1.51B元,同比增长14.1%。

上述业务中,信贷便利服务主要来自助贷撮合、自营小贷、担保、乐花卡等,基本全部来自Fenqile。科技赋能服务主要是公司向银行、消费金融机构输出风控、获客、贷后、技术系统服务,收入增速最快的分期电商平台服务,业务模式为Fenqile商城交易佣金、服务费、场景金融,客户群与信贷业务高度协同,收入也基本来自Fenqile。

综上,Fenqile是乐信收入和利润的核心来源。

核心收入来源——Fenqile的合规问题突出,在监管约谈的明确要求下,乐信真正彻底转型已迫在眉睫。事实上,随着2025年10月助贷新规落地,乐信第四季度的营收和净利润均明显下滑,转型,也成为乐信的现实需求。

实际上,乐信已提前布局转型。公司寄希望于AI技术、海外扩张、分期电商等多元战略。创始人兼董事长兼CEO肖文杰曾公开表示,通过“消费场景+信贷服务”的生态布局,公司在新规下能展现更强的抗风险能力,未来将进一步深耕小微客户、加强金融科技投入。

从目前情况看,乐信的尝试性转型尚处于起步阶段。海外市场方面,乐信在墨西哥、印尼已有初步成效,但竞争激烈,风险也较大。分期电商方面,乐信虽布局多年,但投诉频繁。

根据财报,截至2025年底,乐信平台注册用户达245M,较2024年末增长7.6%。2025年第四季度活跃用户为4.5M,较2024年第四季度的4.7M减少3.8%。2025年全年活跃用户为8.2M,较2024年的8.2M增长0.3%。

这些数据表明,注册用户在增加,但活跃用户出现下降迹象。

转型,如何转?乐信已走到十字路口。

作为行业曾经的先行者,乐信一度被视作行业标杆。然而,野蛮生长积累的合规弊端,让乐信陷入发展困境。消费金融行业监管逐步加强,合规已成为企业生存的底线。

乐信的核心支撑——Fenqile,亟需全面彻底接受合规洗礼。只有真正向科技+服务转型,具备风控优势、成本效率优势、普惠优势,才能实现经营差异化,让消费者真正信赖乐信。

来源:鳌头财经

作者:陈欣

声明:本文仅作为知识分享,只为传递更多信息!本文不构成任何投资建议,任何人据此做出投资决策,风险自负。

View Original
This page may contain third-party content, which is provided for information purposes only (not representations/warranties) and should not be considered as an endorsement of its views by Gate, nor as financial or professional advice. See Disclaimer for details.
  • Reward
  • Comment
  • Repost
  • Share
Comment
Add a comment
Add a comment
No comments