Another well-known baking brand is exiting Beijing after 20 years of operation.

Author: Zhou Bansian

Recently, Singaporean bakery brand BreadTalk closed its last store in Beijing. This flagship store located in Wangfujing, which had been operating for 20 years and upgraded twice, failed to迎来 its next spring.

This is not the first time it has retreated from a core city. Chengdu and Xi’an have already bid farewell. From being called the “Starbucks of the bread world” to a steady retreat, from nearly 500 stores to just over 100, what exactly has BreadTalk experienced?

This is not simply a matter of a single store’s failure or regional adjustment, but a collapse rooted in a expansion model that began 20 years ago, now exploding in concentrated bursts. Its withdrawal may serve as a wake-up call to all restaurant operators rushing into franchise expansion.

01

BreadTalk officially exits the Beijing market

Recently, BreadTalk closed its last store in Beijing. This store, located in the basement of Xintiandi in Wangfujing commercial district, had been open for 20 years, upgraded to a new concept store in 2020, and further renovated in 2022, once serving as the brand’s flagship. With its closure, BreadTalk officially withdraws from the Beijing market.

1. Closure announcement and post-refund arrangements: phone lines unreachable, refunds difficult

The closure notice was posted at the store entrance, claiming that external factors necessitated the closure to provide a better environment for customers—but the phone was unreachable, and refunds were hard to process. Originally scheduled to close on March 12, the date was later extended to the 18th or 19th.

Staff told customers with stored-value cards two options: spend them quickly in-store or take photos to contact the store for delivery; if they insisted on refunding, a deduction of some amount was required.

The author learned that a media reporter repeatedly dialed the customer service number listed on the notice during business hours, but it kept showing the line was busy.

2. Not the first farewell: Chengdu and Xi’an had already withdrawn

This farewell in Beijing is not BreadTalk’s first departure from a city. In 2021, the Xi’an operations company withdrew from Xi’an due to contract disputes and pandemic impacts.

By 2025, all Chengdu stores were closed simultaneously due to contract expirations. Meituan shows that all 11 stores in Chengdu have ceased operations. A media outlet visited the site; after the Tianfu Square store closed, the new store’s construction barrier was replaced with the name of another bakery brand, with new staff replacing old, leaving no trace of the old store.

Additionally, Tianyancha shows that Sichuan Xinyu Catering Management Co., Ltd., established in 2005, operates stores in Sichuan. It received two consumption restriction orders in 2021 and 2024. Although still active, its status has significantly declined.

According to Narrow Door Restaurant Data, as of February 11, 2026, BreadTalk had about 152 stores domestically, with 84 in Guangdong Province, accounting for 55% of the total stores nationwide.

3. Glorious moments: From the “Starbucks of the bread world” to over 400 stores

But BreadTalk also once enjoyed glory. In 2000, it became popular in Singapore with its pork floss bread; in 2003, its parent company BreadTalk went public in Singapore, becoming the world’s first publicly listed bakery enterprise, hailed as the “Starbucks of the bread world.”

That same year, it entered China, establishing presence in Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou, and other 40 core cities. At that time, China’s bakery market still adhered to traditional methods, but BreadTalk brought fresh approaches like transparent open kitchens, diversified operations, and playful naming, quickly capturing the tastes of first-tier cities.

In 2007, BreadTalk boldly declared: within three years, it would open at least 500 stores nationwide. It fully opened franchise opportunities, with franchisees investing and operating in prefecture-level cities.

By 2014, the number of stores in China reached 418, with 60 in Shanghai alone, contributing 31.6% of the headquarters’ revenue, making it its most important overseas market.

But who would have thought that the “Starbucks of the bread world” that aimed to open 500 stores would now be retreating from core cities like Xi’an, Chengdu, and Beijing, with fewer stores closing each day, leaving only scattered memories of its former glory?

02

A complete collapse of the “city franchise” model

The death of BreadTalk was not caused by external environment but by the collapse of its once rapid expansion strategy—the “city franchise model.”

1. City franchise: an efficient expansion cloak, but a risky skeleton

When entering mainland China in 2003, BreadTalk launched an attractive expansion logic: flagship stores in first-tier cities operated directly, while second- and third-tier cities adopted city franchise—granting exclusive operational rights for an entire city to a franchisee, who was responsible for investment, store opening, operation, and management.

This model’s benefits were clear: the brand could rapidly expand at low cost, earning franchise fees and raw material supply profits; franchisees held regional exclusivity, forming regional monopolies and avoiding internal competition.

However, this model carried a fatal structural contradiction: franchisees pursued short-term returns and minimized costs, while the brand needed long-term reputation and sustainable growth. When the market was booming, benefits were masked; when pressure arose, conflicts erupted, ultimately harming the brand and consumers.

The two major closures in Xi’an and Chengdu followed highly similar trajectories: franchisees faced operational and debt crises, broke away from the brand, stores shut overnight, stored-value cards became invalid, and the brand simply exited the city. Each city and franchisee represented the fastest expansion route but also the most fragile death trap.

2. Loss of quality control: unresolvable利益错位 in franchise system

The second pain point of city franchise was the complete collapse of consistent quality control. Since 2014, BreadTalk has repeatedly faced food safety issues across various regions: product quality violations in Hunan in 2017, hygiene problems in Shanghai in 2024, safety concerns in Shenzhen and Chengdu in 2025… scattered incidents accumulated, ultimately eroding consumer trust.

This was not merely management negligence but an inevitable result of利益机制. In direct-operated stores, quality control costs were borne by headquarters, and profits belonged to headquarters, with clear responsibilities; in the franchise model, franchisees saved on quality control costs, with short-term gains, but the entire system bore the damage.

Moreover, franchisees held significant power; headquarters found it difficult to monitor stores remotely and deeply intervene, with expansion outpacing control radius, making quality decline only a matter of time.

3. Lock-in effect: hard to change or control

Despite willingness to transform, BreadTalk’s franchise model created a strong lock-in effect: long-term contracts, heavy assets, complex利益绑定—making reforms difficult.

Store upgrades, product iterations, experience improvements all required franchisee investments; but franchisees preferred conservative management and cost-cutting. Mutual restrictions led to slow market response, causing the brand to fall behind in competition.

Compared to peers: Holiland mainly relies on direct operations for rapid nationwide upgrades; Luxi River opens franchise but maintains strict supply chain and operational standards; Youhe and other emerging brands insist on full直营, controlling every experience.

Who controls operations, who holds long-term dominance.

4. Trust collapse: stored-value cards non-refundable, brand reputation irreversible

Bakery industry features high-frequency, low-price consumption, where consumers base decisions on brand recognition, unable to directly observe kitchen operations or raw material sources. Therefore, the brand is fundamentally a trust carrier. When this trust is repeatedly shaken, repair becomes difficult.

The refund controversy in Chengdu further amplified this trust erosion. Consumers holding stored-value cards couldn’t spend, calls for refunds went unanswered, and purchase receipts were required strictly—these details circulated on social media, deepening public perception of BreadTalk’s “dishonesty.”

Over ten years, various quality issues across different regions, though isolated incidents, accumulated in consumers’ minds as an overall negative impression of the brand.

Once this impression forms, even subsequent management improvements or franchisee changes are hard to quickly alter consumer perception. This reminds us that for chain brands, building trust assets requires long-term investment, and their loss can be irreversible.

Final thoughts

From its high-profile entry into China in 2003 to its current retreat, BreadTalk has completed a full cycle of “success and failure” driven by franchise.

The disappearance of 11 Chengdu stores overnight, consumers unable to refund stored-value cards, and operational debts—these are not isolated incidents but the concentrated result of structural flaws in the city franchise model.

It serves as a painful reminder to the entire industry: in the era of stock competition, rushing faster or scaling bigger does not guarantee victory; controlling quality, managing stores, maintaining trust, and enduring cycles are the true long-term strategies.

BreadTalk’s withdrawal is imminent, but the questions it leaves behind remain: how to choose between franchise and直营? how to balance scale and safety? how to coexist with efficiency and bottom line? The answers are gradually being revealed by the market and time.

What is your view on BreadTalk’s city franchise model? How do you think chain brands should balance expansion speed and control capability?