"Archaeopteryx alternative," Dozens of store formats, Billions in inventory: Anta's crossroads

Can AI · The positioning of the “Ping替” support Anta’s long-term brand value?

Author | Yana

2025 is a year of “great change” for Anta’s flagship brand.

CEO Xu Yang has launched a combination of “high-end technology decentralization + affordable Ping替 + store innovation.” For example, Anta Storm Armor products priced at 1,299 yuan, performance comparable to Arc’teryx, but the price is less than one-third of Arc’teryx. Through many similar “Ping替” products, Anta has turned the “Three Treasures” of the middle class (Arc’teryx / Salomon / KOLON) into “affordable versions.”

At the store level, Anta has begun a channel transformation with “closing small stores, opening large stores, and multi-store format fission,” Anta Champion, Super Anta, ATSV and more than ten store types are rapidly expanding.

However, the recently released financial report of Anta Group shows that the group’s revenue hit a new high of 80.22B yuan, a year-on-year increase of 13.3%, but the data for Anta’s main brand in 2025 is less encouraging:

1. Revenue growth of Anta’s main brand slowed from 10.6% in 2024 to 3.7%;

2. Gross profit margin of the main brand decreased by -0.9%, from 54.5% to 53.6%;

3. The inventory amount of Anta’s main brand increased from 10.76 billion to 12.15 billion, a 13% increase.

As a result, Anta Group’s inventory turnover days increased from 123 days to 137 days, meaning it takes an average of four months to sell a pair of shoes.

Behind the data, Anta’s main brand has reached a “crossroads” of transformation. Slowing growth and high inventory levels—are these signs of a failed transformation or a temporary phase of pain?

Research by Chopping Chili Spicy found that during Anta’s transformation, some significant issues have gradually emerged:

First, more than ten differentiated store formats, while theoretically capable of improving per-store efficiency, are not all accepted by the market, and the excessive number of formats causes consumer confusion and weak association with the Anta main brand;

Second, product lines represented by Anta Champion heavily rely on the “high-end brand line Ping替” label of Arc’teryx and Salomon, making it difficult to establish independent brand value;

Third, the DTC model promoted by Anta has backfired. In the context of fierce industry competition and large-scale new product launches, this model has increased operational pressure, ultimately reflected in lower gross margins, rising inventory, and declining inventory turnover rate in financial data.

Now, as the DTC reform dividends gradually fade, how to improve profitability and operational efficiency has become a critical challenge for Anta.

Anta Group, with thousands of stores, is undergoing a large-scale restructuring of its store network.

According to the earnings conference, the number of Anta main brand stores has shrunk by 64 to 9,855. Adult stores increased by 68 net stores year-on-year, while children’s stores decreased by 132. On one hand, inefficient stores are being closed; on the other hand, the brand is focusing on core commercial districts in first- and second-tier cities, while penetrating into third- and fourth-tier markets.

More importantly, Anta is trying to break the traditional “one size fits all” channel pattern and shift toward a segmented “thousand stores, thousand faces” terminal format.

Currently, Anta stores are divided into five levels: Olympic Arena, Olympic Hall, Elite, Standard, and Basic.

Specifically, according to incomplete analysis by Chopping Chili Spicy, Anta’s main store types mainly include 8 categories: Anta Arena, Anta Hall, Anta SNEAKERVERSE collection stores (“Anta SV”), Anta Champion stores, Super Anta, Anta ZERO concept stores, Anta Linglong children’s stores, and Anta Campus stores.

These formats are further subdivided by space, tone, and scene.

Anta Arena is at the top tier, similar to a flagship store. Single-store area generally exceeds 2,000 square meters and hosts multiple sub-brands, such as the flagship in Shenyang Zhongjie, which includes Anta SV, Anta ZERO, Anta Champion, Anta Children, and Anta WOMEN stores; the Anta Basketball Arena in Shenzhen Yifang Tiandi also features zones for Anta SV and Anta Champion.

Shenzhen Yifang Tiandi Anta Basketball Arena

Beyond traditional product sales, Arena emphasizes scene-based experiences, such as basketball-themed stores like the Shenzhen store, which incorporates professional three-on-three basketball competitions into the store environment.

The second tier includes Anta Palace Hall stores, Anta SV, Anta Champion, and Anta ZERO concept stores. For example, Anta Hall stores are usually around 500 square meters, located in mid-to-high-end malls, focusing on brand history and Olympic elements to convey brand spirit and historical value.

Anta ZERO carbon-neutral concept store on Wukang Road, Shanghai

Positioned as a green pioneer, Anta ZERO is more like a testing ground for the future. The first store opened on Wukang Road, Shanghai; the second in Guangzhou Julu Bay Taikoo Li last year, neighboring brands like Lululemon and Onitsuka Tiger, with the Guangzhou flagship Anta SV standalone store opening simultaneously.

ANTAZERO Guangzhou Julu Bay Taikoo Li

Targeting high-end outdoor brands like Patagonia in the U.S., Anta ZERO emphasizes low-carbon environmental protection. Its products are few but highly recognizable. The main product, ZERO Storm Armor, priced at 1,299 yuan, is the same as the standard version but uses recycled fabrics, increasing male manufacturing costs by 30% and female by 48%. These green products are displayed exclusively in concept stores and also integrated into Anta’s flagship system.

However, the high cost, immersive experience, and slow return model also bring practical pressures. During a one-year anniversary salon at the Wukang Road store, staff revealed that Anta ZERO currently cannot generate profit. Nonetheless, Anta has not slowed down; recently, Anta ZERO collaborated with Kris Van Assche, former Dior Homme and Berluti creative director, on a high-end capsule series, and launched a limited pop-up in Beijing Sanlitun Taikoo Li.

ANTAZERO X KRIS VAN ASSCHE Beijing Sanlitun pop-up

Another high-end line, Anta Champion, was launched at the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics flagship. It is seen as a Ping替 of Kolon and Descente, focusing on bringing national team-level professional technology to mass products, offering higher quality for elite users, priced 30-50% higher than Anta main brand. Public data shows that by mid-2025, Anta Champion has achieved a sevenfold increase in store count, with over 13 stores surpassing 20k yuan in annual sales—2 to 3 times the performance of previous large-scale Anta stores.

Shenyang Zhongjie Anta Champion—Rizhao Jinsan Theme Store

More critically, Anta Champion has successfully entered high-end malls serving high-net-worth clients, competing alongside international high-end sports brands like Arc’teryx and Descente. To penetrate the outdoor market, Anta Champion focuses on cross-country running, hiking, and skiing, sponsoring professional events and using scene-based operations to deeply reach outdoor enthusiasts, gradually building a professional reputation.

In the second tier, the most distinctive is Anta’s first dedicated ball store, Anta SV. It has now officially separated from the main brand, establishing the SV division, with the flagship “ATSV Illusion Alley” store opened last year in Nanjing Road, Shanghai, and a second “ATSV Illusion Alley” store in Taiyuan Zhonglou Street this February.

Taiyuan Zhonglou Street “ATSV Illusion Alley” flagship

Anta SV is an important step in Anta’s high-end progression. Its core value lies in its clear high-end positioning, successfully entering top-tier commercial districts that the main brand struggles with, such as Sanlitun Taikoo Li, Harbour City in Shanghai, IFS in Changsha, and SKP in Wuhan. Anta CEO Xu Yang once revealed in an interview with China Entrepreneur that SKP accepted SV mainly because of trust in Arc’teryx store operations, and SV’s performance exceeded expectations, with monthly sales per square meter reaching 20k yuan—20 times that of Anta’s average.

Beijing Sanlitun SV white-label store—Hutong theme

From the start, Anta SV precisely targeted high-end districts. Its first two stores were in Beijing Heshenghui and Sanlitun Taikoo Li. The former features a black visual style targeting trend-conscious consumers; the latter uses white visuals aimed at a higher-end clientele. Now, Anta SV has expanded into core commercial districts in Shenzhen, Wuhan, Nanchang, Taiyuan, with over 50 stores.

Intensive high-end channel expansion, Anta also launched a “Uniqlo for sports” affordable store format—Super Anta. According to official data, with large-store models, full-category professional products, and optimized flow, Super Anta stores achieve three times the efficiency of traditional stores, with inventory turnover twice as fast as the industry.

Anta Group Executive Director and Co-CEO Lai Shixian mentioned at the earnings call that Super Anta has become an important growth driver for the main brand, with store efficiency continuously improving; additionally, Anta Champion stores average over 500k yuan in sales, SV stores around 600k, and Arena and Hall stores about 850k.

Overall, these “unconventional” store formats have achieved some success.

However, despite impressive data, these formats still face market perception issues.

For example, the “mountain” outdoor-themed Anta Champion stores are criticized online for unclear positioning, with some suggesting they be renamed “Anta Outdoor.”

Meanwhile, the “high-end, affordable” image of Super Anta creates operational awkwardness, with some frontline staff saying many consumers and mall staff treat “Super Anta” as a high-end line of Anta, and the store size is “too intimidating.”

Consumers’ perception of the brand stores and their actual positioning are misaligned, which undoubtedly adds long-term operational pressure.

Although diversified store formats have indeed boosted overall store efficiency and gradually built a high-end perception among consumers, the fragmentation and rapid expansion also bring significant operational challenges.

First, high-efficiency models are hard to replicate at scale. For example, Xu Yang revealed in 2024 that after removing seasonal fluctuations, the annual store efficiency of the Sanlitun SV store exceeded 500k yuan. But such results heavily depend on top-tier traffic in Sanlitun Taikoo Li and are difficult to replicate elsewhere, limiting scale effects.

Meanwhile, stores like Super Anta, Anta SV, and Anta Champion account for less than 1% of total stores, with slow expansion, unable to significantly alter the overall store structure.

Industry analysts suggest that the proliferation of store types can create confusion and dilute the brand’s core value, potentially hindering long-term brand cognition.

In fact, experimenting with multiple formats is common in the sportswear industry, but the high cost of trial and error is also evident for Anta.

Xu Yang once said in an interview that early on, Anta tried some store format innovations but ended up with significant losses. Even at the SV stage, limited store numbers caused issues like insufficient order quantities and limited supply of popular shoes. Despite these pressures, Xu Yang insists on keeping SV separate from the main brand, warning that “relying on big orders will lead to dependence, which is a dead end.”

In practice, this separation has not been fully realized. While Anta SV relies on dedicated sneaker lines to differentiate itself, product overlap with other store types remains.

For example, the popular Fan Zhendong series BorntobeFANtastic is sold across various store types—Anta flagship stores, PALACE stores, SV stores, and outlet stores—further blurring the store format distinctions.

No matter how many high-end formats are added, the core challenge of elevating Anta’s high-end perception remains unresolved. Moving from low-price to high-end ultimately still hinges on the “Ping替” positioning.

Xu Yang mentioned in a 2023 interview that Anta’s “mass-market positioning and brand upgrading” does not mean high prices directly. Instead, it involves increasing the average transaction value, basket size, supported by IP-based and series-based products, leveraging high-end technology to empower the mass market. In his view, “mass” does not mean cheap but high cost-performance Ping替.

This strategy is reflected in products. Almost all stores of the main brand carry Ping替 products comparable to high-end brands. The professional outdoor line, Anta Champion, is a typical Ping替 zone.

On social media, many consumers say Anta Champion’s products resemble Arc’teryx but cost only a third, making them perfect Ping替.

For example, the Anta Champion PLOARTEC knitted sports top is seen as a perfect Ping替 for Arc’teryx COVERT, with similar POLARTEC material but thicker, and some think the logo is a downside—“Anta Guanjun” in a string of English looks less premium.

The outdoor series, Pro, is also considered to have Salomon-inspired design and scene positioning.

Anta’s chaotic product lineup has also drawn consumer complaints, especially about the high cost-performance Champion series, which faces criticism over tone consistency and product recognition.

However, outdoor products like Anta Champion inherently demand high functionality and professionalism, making differentiation difficult.

Industry insiders told Chopping Chili that even top outdoor brands like Arc’teryx have undergone long-term R&D and iteration to develop mature, functional designs, and some design elements are reused normally.

More importantly, the product strength of the main brand shows a “point explosion” but lacks overall balance.

From sales, reputation, and social media buzz, Anta’s footwear market voice is concentrated in running shoes (PG7, C202, Mahe) and basketball shoes (KAI, KT). The PG7 and C202 series are absolute top sellers. Outdoor and training shoes like Tany, Duci, and Shenxing lack flagship models and key technologies, making their market presence weak and unable to drive overall footwear growth.

In terms of revenue structure, by 2025, Anta footwear growth is only 7.9%, the slowest among the three major categories, with its contribution dropping 1.9 percentage points to 39.3%. This indicates that outside professional running shoes, Anta’s other footwear categories still lack competitiveness, and the overall growth of the footwear business is weak.

For Anta, the current priority is to break out of the comfort zone of running shoes, accelerate filling category gaps, and push technological and blockbuster capabilities into outdoor, training, and lifestyle tracks.

Despite breakthroughs in store channels and product transformation, financial and operational pressures are evident.

The report explains the gross margin decline as due to increased costs of professional equipment and higher e-commerce channel share, which has a lower gross margin, dragging down overall profitability.

Industry experts told Chopping Chili that the decline in gross margin is influenced by multiple factors: from a cost perspective, raw material prices have risen with improved material performance and technology, but retail prices have not increased proportionally. Also, the “Super Anta” product line is positioned as a collection of sports gear, priced lower than regular Anta, resulting in lower margins.

On the market side, last year, Anta increased online promotion and sales efforts. The financial report shows that in 2025, online sales of the main brand grew by 7.3%, accounting for 37% of total revenue, the fastest among four business models.

Third-party e-commerce monitoring agencies analyzed that during the 618 shopping festival, core products were discounted between 30-40%. During Double 11, Anta launched a “six-fold discount” on Tmall, partnered with Meituan Flash Sale for instant retail, and offered large coupons like “spend 200, get 200 off,” significantly boosting promotional intensity.

This discount-driven sales strategy, while increasing volume, likely lowers ASP (average selling price) and is a key factor in dragging down brand gross margins.

Additionally, in 2025, Anta’s average inventory turnover days increased from 123 to 137 days, with inventory value rising 13% to 12.15 billion yuan. The company attributes this to business expansion, new product stocking, and acquisitions.

Chopping Chili learned from industry insiders that a major reason for inventory pressure is the expansion of new store formats, which require a large increase in SKU counts tailored for these formats. Many high-quality products previously performed poorly in regular stores but found new channels with the new formats, leading to a significant SKU expansion.

From an industry perspective, high inventory levels are a common pain point, and Anta’s deep push into DTC channels has directly transmitted this pressure onto the brand itself.

In recent years, Anta has prioritized DTC transformation as a core strategy. Anta Vice President & CMO Zhu Chenye revealed last year that DTC stores now number over 8,000, accounting for more than 80%.

Anta’s DTC model is a hybrid of “mainly direct-operated stores, supplemented by franchise.” It opens direct stores in core urban districts and high-end shopping centers, while in second- and third-tier cities and lower-tier markets, it selects franchisees that meet brand standards.

Over the past year, Anta has continued to optimize its DTC franchise scale. Financial data shows that in 2025, DTC direct sales accounted for 35.4% of revenue, up 0.8 percentage points year-on-year, with a 5.9% increase in revenue; franchise sales shrank by 1.3 percentage points to 18.4%, with a 3.4% decline in revenue.

It is worth noting that DTC has historically helped improve gross margins during high-growth periods. But in a saturated, highly competitive market, the inventory and operational risks that could be shared by channels now fall entirely on the brand, posing severe challenges to product competitiveness and supply chain efficiency.

Industry observations suggest that the inventory and cost pressures from DTC are much greater than traditional dealer models because DTC requires the brand to bear all costs of store decoration, rent, staffing, and inventory profit/loss, effectively taking on risks previously shared by distributors. Compared to traditional dealer models, the supply chain is longer, with more losses and frictions.

It is clear that Anta’s main brand is at a critical stage of comprehensive transformation.

Although Ding Shizhong explicitly stated at the earnings meeting that “brand value cannot be measured solely by short-term profit margins,” and that the company must continue investing heavily in R&D, sports resources, and global markets due to the brand’s nature,

the rapid implementation of store and product reforms raises the question: can operational efforts now effectively improve inventory turnover and profitability? This remains a key challenge for Anta.

Currently, the sportswear industry’s operating profit margins are generally between 12% and 20%. Anta’s guidance indicates that by 2026, its operating profit margin will remain around 20%, roughly consistent with the 2025 actual level of 20.7%, maintaining stable profitability. Despite slower growth, Anta remains firmly in the top tier of the industry, a notable achievement.

As the dividends fade and competition intensifies, the “second startup” of Anta’s main brand is no longer about expansion speed but about refined operations and value accumulation.