Not renewed! Another bank card acquiring license has been canceled!

(Source: First Payment News)

In April 2026, China’s People’s Bank of China official website’s “Payment Business License Information Disclosure” page quietly updated, and the name Guangdong Huika Business Services Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Guangdong Huika”) appeared prominently on the list of “Cancelled Licensing Institutions,” with a clear note stating “No renewal (change of license).” This is the second payment license canceled in 2026 after Henan Jubao Payment, and the 110th license to be withdrawn since the first batch was issued in 2011. From the once “license dividend” to the current “compliance survival line,” the reshuffling of the payment industry has entered deep waters, and Guangdong Huika’s exit is a typical footnote in this regulatory storm.

Guangdong Huika’s “exit” was not accidental.

This payment institution, established in 2010, obtained the “Payment Business License” issued by the central bank in 2013, with a business scope limited to bank card acquiring within Guangdong Province. However, its compliance path had long been riddled with hidden dangers: in 2021, the company was sentenced by the court for connecting with illegal fourth-party payment platforms such as “Mulong” and “helloepay,” providing funding channels for cross-border gambling gangs, with a case amount of up to 4.31B yuan; from 2022 to 2025, it received three “double penalties” from the central bank for violations related to merchant management, payment account management, and other regulations, with total fines exceeding 32 million yuan. In 2023, its license renewal application was suspended due to “circumstances specified in Article 24 of the Administrative Licensing Implementation Measures of the People’s Bank of China,” and three years later, the final outcome arrived.

Guangdong Huika’s experience is not an isolated case.

As of April 2026, the central bank has canceled a total of 110 payment licenses, with 23, 16, 10, and 12 licenses canceled in 2022, 2023, 2024, and 2025 respectively, maintaining a double-digit clearance pace for four consecutive years. In terms of business types, prepaid card licenses account for over 80%, but the cancellation rate of bank card acquiring licenses is gradually rising—exit of acquiring institutions like Guangdong Huika, UBS Pay, and Jinyuntong Network Payment indicates that regulatory rectification has moved from “marginal businesses” into the “core battlefield.”

Behind this round of reshuffling is a fundamental shift in regulatory logic.

After the implementation of the “Regulations on the Supervision and Administration of Non-Banking Payment Institutions” in 2024, regulation shifted from “periodic review” to “normalization of penetration,” summarized by three strict measures:

First, the renewal review of licenses has become stricter. The People’s Bank of China explicitly states that institutions with major illegal violations, risk hazards, or poor management will not be renewed. Guangdong Huika, involved in money laundering cases, fined multiple times, and with its equity auctioned (in 2023, its directors’ equity was auctioned due to no bidders), exemplifies the “hard injuries” leading to non-renewal.

Second, the “double penalty system” has become normalized. Since 2026, institutions like Yinsheng Payment and Kailian Tong Payment have been penalized with “double penalties” (for the institution and responsible persons), with fines exceeding 54 million yuan. Regulation is pushing senior management to take responsibility, forcing institutions to shift from “passive rectification” to “proactive prevention.”

Third, entry thresholds have been significantly raised. The “Implementation Rules for the Regulations on the Supervision and Administration of Non-Banking Payment Institutions” require a minimum registered capital of 100 million yuan and the establishment of dynamic net assets linked to the average daily reserve fund balance. Many small and medium-sized institutions, lacking capital strength, are forced to merge or exit—examples include Xiaohongshu’s acquisition of Oriental Payment and Tongcheng Travel’s acquisition of Xinsheng Payment in 2025, reflecting industry consolidation.

The “retreat” of payment licenses is essentially an inevitable transformation from “wild growth” to “high-quality development.” Over the past decade, some institutions relied on gray methods such as “code wrapping,” “jumping codes,” and “outsourcing out of control” to expand, even becoming channels for money laundering and gambling. Now, regulation employs “penetration-based” verification (such as matching transaction flows, merchant qualifications, and fund flows) and “technological empowerment” (like AI anti-money laundering models), making violations impossible to hide.

For payment institutions, “compliance” has shifted from a “cost item” to a “survival line.” On one hand, leading institutions like Alipay and Tenpay strengthen their moat through technological investments (such as Ant’s SHIELD risk control model) and ecosystem integration; on the other hand, small and medium institutions either focus on vertical scenarios (like Baofu Payment’s medical B2B payments) or seek mergers—by 2026, more license-expired institutions are expected to accelerate “finding buyers,” and those unable to transform will gradually exit.

Guangdong Huika’s exit is a clear signal of the “zero tolerance” policy from regulators and an inevitable result of industry “survival of the fittest.” From 110 licenses canceled to the normalization of “double penalties,” from capital thresholds to new cross-border payment battlegrounds, the payment industry is bidding farewell to the “license dividend” and entering a new era where “compliance is king.” In the future, only those embedding “risk prevention” throughout their operations and replacing “channel dependence” with “technological services” will stand firm under strict regulation and truly become the “infrastructure” of the digital economy.