Misty Storage Black Horse IPO: Regulatory Requirements Clarify "Is There Any Benefit Transfer?"

AI Questions · Does the mysterious major client have a hidden link to storage?

With listing in Hong Kong becoming the trend, some have spent a decade honing their skills to successfully break into the international arena, while others are eager to speculate—trying to complete a risky leap through the capital “stepping stone.”

On January 9, Shenzhen Energy Storage Technology Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “ Energy Storage”), which claims to be #1 among “global energy storage asset full-lifecycle solution providers,” submitted its listing application materials to the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited. In the filing materials, it looks like a “storage black horse” with sharply growing performance.

As for the application materials, the HKEX did not provide any comments. However, on April 3, the China Securities Regulatory Commission clearly issued requirements and made them public, requiring Energy Storage to further supplement its overseas issuance and listing备案 materials, covering multiple issues, including inconsistencies in the recognition results of the controlling shareholders, whether there is abnormal share-in consideration, and whether there is any transfer of interests, among others.

Founded in 2019, Energy Storage is an integrated energy storage system (ESS) solution provider, focusing on the R&D, manufacturing, and sales of energy storage system solutions. In its listing application materials, Huaxia Energy Network also found numerous suspicious points:

For example, the company claims to be “the global #1,” yet its overseas revenue share is only 1%; in the mere 3 months right before the IPO, multiple institutions rushed in to take stakes at the same time, but there is a huge valuation difference; the “independent third-party” major customer contributing huge revenue to it—turns out to have paid-in capital of 0 and to be a mysterious company that began cooperating immediately upon establishment…

Behind the scenes of this IPO drama at Energy Storage, a series of financial and operational data are shrouded in mist. As regulators pay attention, this capital play is likely to end up much more difficult than anyone imagined.

Regulators clearly require an explanation: Is there any transfer of interests?

In July 2019, Wang Jue and Zhang Jiajing co-founded Energy Storage in Shenzhen. But it was not until four years later, in 2023, that Energy Storage introduced its first external financing.

The most recent round of financing was right before it submitted its IPO prospectus. On December 30, 2025, Energy Storage completed a new round of equity financing in the amount of several hundred million yuan, with investors including Shenzhen Nanhai Growth (RMB 80 million), Capital (RMB 100 million), Zhuoyuan Blueprint (RMB 20 million), and other institutions.

Huaxia Energy Network noted that the entry price for the three institutions was RMB 6.25 per share. But the odd part is that, although other institutions and individual investors also took stakes in December, their costs differed dramatically from those three.

On December 8 and December 15, the investment price of individual investors including Jiang Guoying and Chen Xiong, and institutional investor Dongguan Bopu, was RMB 4.69 per share. Only half a month later, the cost jumped 33.26% to RMB 6.25 per share. And even earlier, in September, the costs of individual investors such as Tan Cuihui, Wang Yu, Chen Jiating, and others were only RMB 3.75 per share.

In the same month, wildly different stake-in costs among different investors mean that—assuming the company’s fundamentals did not change—the valuation inexplicably surged out of thin air. What kind of scheme could be behind this?

In response, the CSRC required Energy Storage to submit supplementary materials explaining “the pricing basis for newly added shareholders entering into shareholding within the last 12 months, the reasons for and reasonableness of the differences between that pricing and the pricing for capital increases at the same time,” as well as “the status of tax and fee payments,” and to provide a clear, conclusive opinion on whether there is “abnormal share-in consideration” and whether there is “any transfer of interests.”

Multiple qualifiers for “the global #1”: How much real value is there?

Of course, capital does not do charity for no reason. Behind institutions enduring high premiums to rush in right before the IPO is the grand globalization narrative that Energy Storage has packaged.

Energy Storage cites data from Frost&Sullivan, saying that in the first three quarters of 2025, the company ranked #1 among providers of solutions for energy storage asset full life-cycle solutions globally, based on 1.3 GWh of independent energy storage newly installed capacity, with a market share of 20%. In 2024, measured by energy storage system shipment volume, it ranked globally fifth with 3.7 GWh.

Huaxia Energy Network checked and found on Frost&Sullivan’s official website that the company was established in 1961 on Wall Street and claims to be an “investment and enterprise growth consulting professional services institution,” with around 3,000 consulting consultants and analysts. The company’s business is to “help clients achieve growth in the industry, technological innovation and pioneering benchmark status, and achieve capital operation goals such as financing and going public.”

Clearly, Energy Storage’s so-called “global #1” is customized by Frost&Sullivan for this purpose. If 1.3 GWh represents 20% of the global share, then the scale of the “global market” that Energy Storage refers to is only about 6.5 GWh—still far short of the capacity of a single factory under a domestic leading energy storage enterprise. With such a “global #1,” how much value can it really have?

It is worth noting that Energy Storage repeatedly emphasizes that it is a “leading global integrated energy storage system solutions provider,” and it mentions global layout and overseas expansion multiple times in its prospectus, attempting to paint a picture of global layout and global leadership.

However, after stripping away a string of qualifiers like “independent energy storage,” “newly installed capacity,” and “global energy storage asset full life-cycle solutions,” what is the actual quality of Energy Storage’s “global #1”?

In fact, the prospectus shows that 99% of Energy Storage’s revenue comes from the China market. Meanwhile, the prospectus also explicitly states that “since its establishment, it has been deeply rooted in China’s domestic market.”

But in the words of the company’s executives, Energy Storage has already been an international company for a long time:

In 2024, Energy Storage’s CEO Zhang Jiajing claimed in an interview that, based on the company’s in-hand orders, it is expected that overseas business revenue will already account for about 20% in 2024. By the end of 2025, overseas revenue will reach 50% of the company’s full-year revenue, achieving a transformation from domestic to international.

At that time, Zhang Jiajing estimated that the overseas market would deliver nearly 1 GWh of energy storage systems in 2024. But in reality, in the second half of 2024, Energy Storage only then began to develop overseas business.

The prospectus figures directly contradict Zhang Jiajing’s claim: in 2024, Energy Storage’s overseas revenue was 0. By the first three quarters of 2025, Energy Storage’s overseas revenue was RMB 8.6 million, accounting for only 1% of total revenue. This modest RMB 8.6 million of overseas revenue relied entirely on selling energy storage system products to a single U.S. customer.

Even more ironic is that this company, which calls itself a “global leader,” has a total of 52 people across its global business and sales teams, and only 6 of them work overseas. How will Energy Storage address this huge narrative gap between the prospectus’s phrasing, executives’ boastful statements, and the actual numbers?

If the product prices are far below market prices, how can it still be profitable?

After stripping away the “global #1” facade, the financial data of Energy Storage is also worth pondering.

Most of Energy Storage’s revenue comes from deployment of integrated energy storage system solutions in a single large project. From 2023 to the first three quarters of 2025, its solution sales increased from 46 MWh to 1.35 GWh, while its system product volume fell from 2.76 GWh to 1.12 GWh.

From 2023 to the first three quarters of 2025, Energy Storage’s revenue was RMB 435 million, RMB 1,144 million, and RMB 881 million respectively, and its net profit was RMB 40.74M, RMB 96.27M, and RMB 70.89M respectively.

It is worth noting that starting from the second half of 2023, competition in the energy storage industry became intense, and 2024’s price wars were even harsher. Selling below cost has become an industry norm, while the selling prices of Energy Storage’s products were even lower than the industry average.

According to data from the Zhongguancun Energy Storage Industry Technology Alliance (CNESA), in 2025 the bid-winning price range for energy storage system procurement was RMB 0.391 per Wh to RMB 0.913 per Wh, and the full-year average bid-winning price for 2-hour energy storage systems was RMB 0.554 per Wh.

In the reporting period, the selling price of Energy Storage’s integrated energy storage system solutions fell from RMB 1.26 per Wh to RMB 0.44 per Wh—a drop of as much as 65%; the average price of its energy storage system products also fell from RMB 0.66 per Wh to RMB 0.38 per Wh—a drop of 58%.

According to Energy Storage’s official website, its flagship product is a 2-hour energy storage system. This means that the selling price of Energy Storage’s products is not only 31% lower than the industry average, but it even breaks through the industry’s lowest bid-winning price.

Behind the low price is the sacrifice of profit in exchange for market share. However, strangely enough, Energy Storage breaks this iron rule: its gross margin has remained consistently around 18%. In the reporting period, Energy Storage’s gross margin was 21.6%, 17.8%, and 18.3% respectively. Although this gross margin is quite different from system integrators such as Sungrow Power (SZ:300274) and Kelu Electronic (SZ:002121), it is enough to be on par with the industry leader Haibo Sichuang (SH:688411).

How exactly does Energy Storage achieve low prices and a high gross margin?

Huaxia Energy Network noticed that Energy Storage’s performance shows extreme quarter-to-quarter volatility: in the first three quarters of 2024, the company’s revenue was only RMB 124 million, with a loss of RMB 49.27 million; but in the fourth quarter of 2024, its single-quarter revenue surged to RMB 1 billion, and net profit jumped to RMB 140 million, turning losses into profits in one move.

For the system products and solutions sold by Energy Storage, revenue is typically recognized only when large customers accept them. The concentration of revenue recognition timing may obscure anomalies in the cost structure. Could these extreme bursts of performance and the stability of gross margin be related to the pricing arrangements of the “mysterious major client”?

The mysterious “independent third party”—what is the connection behind it?

To solve the mystery of the gross margin, we may need to look at who is actually paying for Energy Storage?

The prospectus shows that in 2024 and the first three quarters of 2025, Energy Storage’s top five customers contributed more than 80% of revenue. Among them, the contribution of a single major customer was 40.7% and 30.7% of total revenue, respectively.

Although Energy Storage emphasizes that its top five customers each year are “independent third parties,” Huaxia Energy Network found that several customer companies became major customers not only in the year of their establishment or the next year, and their paid-in capital, number of insured employees in industry and commerce, and other aspects differ greatly from the scale of orders—and they even have intricate connections with Energy Storage.

(In the “Customers” section, Energy Storage emphasizes that “all of our top five suppliers are independent third parties.” Here it should be a typographical error; “top five suppliers” should be “top five customers.”)

The first major customer in the first three quarters of 2025, Yaoan Xinrui Energy Storage Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Yaoan Xinrui”), was established in January 2025. In just 8 months, it contributed a massive revenue of RMB 271 million to Energy Storage, accounting for 30.8% of the first three quarters of 2025 revenue.

According to Tianyancha, Yaoan Xinrui—having signed massive procurement orders—has registered capital of only RMB 10 million, paid-in capital of 0, and appears to be a shell company. More notably, Yaoan Xinrui’s behind-the-scenes shareholders have a complicated relationship with Energy Storage.

Yaoan Xinrui is 100% controlled by Pan Sili. Pan Sili also serves as a director, supervisor, and other positions in multiple companies under “Zhixin BoYan (Wang Jue and Zhang Jiajing each hold 100%, and it is the core controlling platform of Energy Storage),” including Yaoan Huayi New Energy, Huahui Wind Power Generation, Heze Zhixin New Energy, Yongping Ruihai New Energy, and others. He is also an executive at Yaoan Zhixin BoYan Technology Co., Ltd.

No matter from the company name or the underlying equity, it is not hard to see that the shareholder of this “top major customer” has a very deep connection with Energy Storage.

Not only that, the only company that Yaoan Xinrui invests in externally is Yunnan Junhe Zhixin New Energy Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Yunnan Junhe”), which is also related to Energy Storage.

Huaxia Energy Network noticed that the shadow of the “Junhe group” repeatedly appears in both the front and behind-the-scenes of Energy Storage. Behind the list of Energy Storage’s major customers, there is a network of related entities intertwined with Energy Storage, named with “Junhe.”

First, Yunnan Junhe was established in May 2025, and the original shareholders were Hebei Junhe Zhixin Energy Storage Technology Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Hebei Zhixin”). Hebei Zhixin’s two major shareholders are Energy Storage holding 10% and Hebei Junhe Xinchuang Energy Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Hebei Junhe”) holding 90%.

Second, Hebei Junhe is exactly Energy Storage’s fourth major customer in 2024. That year, it contributed about RMB 89.5 million in revenue to Energy Storage. This company, established in 2023, has registered capital of RMB 20 million and paid-in capital of RMB 8 million. In 2024, the number of insured employees in its industry and commerce records was only 8.

Third, in the first three quarters of 2025, Energy Storage’s fourth major customer was Jilin Junhe Xinchuang Energy Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Jilin Junhe”), established in September 2024 and continuously 100% controlled by Hebei Junhe. In 2024, the number of insured employees was 0.

The “Junhe group” not only contributed substantial revenue to Energy Storage; its relationship with Energy Storage is also bewildering.

For example, Jilin Junhe changed its legal representative in April 2025. Before the change, it was “Wang Tiancai.” Wang Tiancai also served as the legal representative of Hebei Junhe—that is, Energy Storage’s fourth major customer in 2024. In addition, Wang Tiancai served as legal representative and, in 2024, established three companies starting with “Hebei Junhe.” In 2025, those companies were gradually deregistered, including Hebei Zhixin — a company in which Energy Storage had once held a stake.

More coincidentally, just around the eve of the third quarter of 2025, when Energy Storage’s IPO information cutoff point was reached, Hebei Zhixin was deregistered and exited Yunnan Junhe as a shareholder. The party taking over was precisely Yaoan Xinrui (the first major customer in the first three quarters of 2025). Hebei Junhe also exited the shareholder list of Jilin Junhe during this time period. This timing is worth pondering.

Tracing further back, Energy Storage’s first major customer in 2023 was Anhui Haode Energy Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Haode Energy”), established in March 2022. In the same year it was established, it started cooperating with Energy Storage, and in 2023 it contributed RMB 51.3 million in revenue to Energy Storage.

Tianyancha shows that Haode Energy has registered capital of RMB 50 million and paid-in capital of 0, and the number of insured employees in its industry and commerce records in 2022 through 2024 was 1 person each year.

Across the above multiple companies, paid-in capital is 0, employee numbers are minimal, cooperation happens immediately after establishment, executives and legal representatives overlap, and their names and equity are also related. These characteristics repeatedly appear in Energy Storage’s list of major customers. The flow of business that is described as “independent third parties” ultimately converges into the eye-catching figures in the prospectus—perhaps it is not merely coincidence.

Profit can be adjusted, and major customers can be fabricated. This is something commonly seen in IPO companies that later run into problems. Whether Energy Storage has issues like these remains to be confirmed and verified by regulators using their authority.

The door of capital markets is always open to real, valuable companies. But listing is never the ultimate goal of a company. For Energy Storage, beginning the IPO journey is the first step of placing itself under the spotlight. Whether responding to fierce external competition or straightening out internal compliance red lines—the real test is only just beginning.

Author’s statement: personal views only, for reference only